VACATION POST 1 of 5. With smart bombs and terrorist human bombs, naval warfare seem mostly an anachronism. It has been 23 years since the last sinking of a major warship. In June 1982 the British nuclear attack sub HMS Conqueror sank the Argentine heavy cruiser General Belgrano, when the ship entered the exclusion zone established by the Royal Navy; Argentina claimed the destroyer HMS Sheffield as a victim, via an air-launched French (naturally) Exocet missile. There were several air skirmishes, with Prince Andrew one of the carrier-based UK pilots. Perhaps the best memorial nuggets from that conflict over possession of island with more sheep than people was the tart comeback of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher when asked what if the UK's effort failed. Maggie missed nary a beat, quoting Queen Victoria of sainted memory: "The possibility of failure does not exist!"
Recently England marked the bicentennial of its most famous naval battle, Trafalgar, the climax of several months of maneuvering, in which hero-for-the-ages Admiral Horatio Nelson gave his life, but defeated the French off the Spanish coast and relegated Napoleon to adventures on land. World War I saw one great, anti-climactic battle, in May 1916 off Jutland; it was said of British Admiral Sir John Jellicoe and his Grand Fleet that he was the only man in England who could lose the war in a single afternoon. Thus his risk-averse conduct of the main engagement despite superior firepower--preserve the British Fleet, the Sceptred Isle's lifeline, at all costs. British losses were greater, but the Kaiser's High Seas Fleet was bottled up for the rest of the war.
American naval history is marked--at least, for earlier generations of students, by several pithy quotes, rather than grand battles: "I have just begun to fight!" "Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead!" "We have met the enemy and they are ours!" "You may fire when ready, Gridley!" (Answers at the end of this article.) The most famous US naval battles were the 1862 Monitor-Merrimac ironclad draw, and the smashing destruction of four Japanese carriers in June 1942 off Midway Island. Both engagements were relatively brief, nothing like Trafalgar. But there is a Trafalgar-style balletof battles in American naval history. It was the last grand naval battle in world history, with a sacrificial charge as heroic as any in military annals; it was named after a place few Americans, even of my generation, know about: The Battle of Leyte Gulf, Oct.23 - 26, 1944. That is the title of a magnificent book by Naval War College historian and professor of strategy and policy, Thomas J. Cutler (Bluejacket Books 2001). The story, in a nutshell:
To set the stage, in 1942, 6 months almost to the day after Japan bombed Pearl Harbor, the US Navy won a smashing victory at Midway Island, sinking four Japanese carriers. But thousands of miles away, 1942 saw the humiliating defeat of American and Filipino forces at Bataan and Corregidor, with tens of thousands marched off the confinement (so harsh that 1/3 of prisoners died in Japanese camps, more than ten times the fatality rate in Nazi prison camps). The Commander of the Philippine garrison, General Douglas MacArthur, was ordered by FDR to evacuate; MacArthur was such a prestigious figure that FDR feared the General's capture might be calamitous for Allied morale in the Pacific War. Famously, MacArthur vowed upon departing Corregidor: "I shall return."
After Midway, America began a twin-pronged "island-hopping" campaign across the Pacific, headed for the Japanese homeland. The better-known prong was in the open Pacific, starting with the Solomon islands at Guadalcanal; the second prong, led by MacArthur, now based in Australia, sent American and Australian troops into the vast New Guinea jungles. (New Guinea is an island second only to Australia in size; its length would stretch from America's east coast to the foothills of the Rockies.)
By 1944 the Allies had made great progress, approaching the Marianas Islands, from whose perch US B-29 bombers could launch the massive air assault against the Japanese homeland. In June 1944 Admiral Raymond Spruance smashed a Japanese carrier force in the famed "Marianas Turkey Shoot," but chose not to chase the remaining ships, lest he leave forces on land unprotected. His decision split senior US leaders, and would have fateful consequences for the upcoming battle at Leyte.
The Allies faced a strategic choice: drive in a straighter line towards the Japanese homeland to possibly accelerate termination of the air, via Formosa (Taiwan today) and China, or detour off of a straight line and liberate the Philippines. Proponents of the first course, including the formidable Admiral Ernest King, US Fleet Commander, made purely military arguments to Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, and FDR. MacArthur's case was more political: He argued that bypassing the Philippines and thus leaving tens of thousands of Americans and loyal Filipinos dying in hideous prison conditions was immoral, and would alienate public opinion at home and in the Philippines. MacArthur's view prevailed.
The Japanese High Command knew after the Marianas debacle that time was running short. A successful American landing in the Philippines would spell certain doom. They decided to send their entire remaining fleet in a desperate attempt to stave off defeat. Admiral Takeo Kurita was told to spare nothing. The Japanese faced vastly superior forces, especially as to aircraft carriers, but inflicting a morale-deflating defeat was within the realm of possibility. They resolved to try to use a strategy of complex maneuver and deception to defeat the Americans (and Australians). The Japanese had few surviving flat-tops, plus several battleships, featuring the two largest dreadnoughts ever built, the super-battleships Yamato and Musashi, displacing 72,800 tons fully loaded. These behemoths sported nine 18.1-inch guns, which could fire their 3,200 pound projectiles up to 27 miles; the three main-gun turrets, at nearly 2,800 tons, each weighed more than a destroyer. A few feet shorter than the US Iowa-class ships (America's largest, with nine 16-inch guns firing 2,700-pound shells up to 25 miles), the Japanese monsters were much wider, that being necessary to absorb the recoil of their largest-ever naval batteries. US ships were limited by the need to pass through the Panama Canal, 110 feet wide; thus the Iowa class ships were 108"6' wide. Yamato and Musashi were 135 feet wide. But these super-dreadnoughts were ideal for a World War I battle, when no planes darkened the skies.
Leyte Gulf was mainly fought in 4 battles, each with its own signature: (1) Sibuyan Sea, Oct. 24; (2) Surigao Strait, Oct. 24-25; (3) Cape Engano, Oct. 24; (4) Samar, Oct. 25. (On Oct. 23 , as prelude, two US submarines sank several Japanese ships on the way to the battle area.) Sibuyan Sea saw US air power sink the Musashi and several other ships in Admiral Kurita's main fleet. This proved once again that air power trumped battleships, as earlier wartime sinkings had shown (Bismarck, Prince of Wales and Repulse in 1941). But Yamato would have its chance, soon.
Before that day, however, Surigao Strait saw the last "crossing the T" in naval history, with US battleships--some repaired after damage suffered at Pearl Harbor, sinking two Japanese battleships (older ones) in a night engagement; the "T" is crossed when ships line up broadside against approaching ships in single file, allowing the broadside ships to concentrate all their firepower against ships limited to forward guns.
The most critical battles were those at Engano and Samar. The Japanese sent their four remaining aircraft carriers, with few airplanes, as decoys to the north of the main Philippine island, Luzon, waiting off a Cape whose Spanish name means "trick," "deceit" or "fraud." The trick worked, Admiral William F. ("Bull") Halsey, mindful of Spruance's decision not to pursue at Marianas, sent his entire carrier and battleship force north. They did indeed inflict great damage upon engaging the fleet. But they left the other strait, San Bernadino, that led to Samar, where a beachhead had been established a few days earlier (when MacArthur fulfilled his pledge to return, wading ashore under fire). Into this opening Admiral Kurita's fleet, less damaged than Halsey imagined, went sailing.
Kurita's fleet emerged in late morning Oct. 25 off Samar. Between his surviving battleships, including mega-ship Yamato, were 16 escort carriers and several destroyers and destroyer-escorts, all lightly-armed. Escort carriers were small flat-tops that carried, as did destroyer escorts, small planes used for reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare. Regular destroyers had only guns, the largest being 5-inchers. Against them were several battleships besides Yamato, plus cruisers also vastly more powerful. Admiral Raymond Sprague ordered his destroyers and destroyer-escorts to charge the Japanese capital ships, trying desperately to buy time. Admiral Halsey had by then realized he had been snookered; Halsey had ordered the nearest carrier group to steam towards Samar; the carrier force was headed by none other than Senator John McCain's grandfather, John Sr. But it would not get to Samar in time to affect the battle.
Four small ships, USS Samuel B. Roberts, USS Johnston, USS Hoel and USS Heerman, armed with small guns and torpedoes, charged the Japanese ships, sending up smoke screen to assist their advance. It was a real-life replay of a charge that, in an astounding calendar coincidence, had taken place exactly 90 years earlier to the day: the charge of British cavalry against Russian artillery at Sevastopol, immortalized by Alfred, Lord Tennyson in his Charge of the Light Brigade. Except that the first charge was a blunder, made in vain; not so the second, an inspired masterstroke that saved the day. And so into the Valley of Death rode 1944's valiant 600--about the same number of sailors. Three ships were sunk; USS Heerman survived, badly damaged. The Yamato was forced to break off the attack to evade torpedoes. Admiral Kurita, seeing US planes approaching on the horizon, elected to depart, rather than sacrifice his fleet as he had been ordered to do; his reasons for doing so are unclear to this day.
Admiral Kurita saved the remnants of his fleet, to no avail. No significant naval battle took place thereafter. On April 6, 1945, the Japanese High command sent Yamato on a lone-ship suicide mission, the kind first used in the war by airplanes at Leyte Gulf, on Oct. 25, against US ships. This kamikaze attack, time by ship instead of plane, would be launched against the American fleet supporting the landing at Okinawa, last and bloodiest of the island campaigns. (Kamikaze means "Divine Wind," and refers to two storms, in 1274 and 1281, that spared Japan conquest by the Mongols, whose fleets were sunk by typhoons.) Yamato never got close enough to engage ships; she was sunk by 400 carrier planes on April 7, 1945.
Yamato met an ignominious end, virtually helpless under air assault. Not so the sailors who in small ships of Samar, on October 25, 1944 charged the biggest guns ever mounted at sea, galloping, as it were, into "the Valley of Death." They well fit the poet Stephen Spender's words:
Born of the sun they traveled a short while towards the sun,
And left the vivid air signed with their honor.
Quiz Answers: (a) John Paul Jones, Revolutionary War-1779; (b) David Farragut, Civil War--1863; (c) Oliver Hazard Perry, War of 1812--in 1813; (d) Commodore Dewey, Manila Bay, May 1898, Spanish-American War.
Map: Battle of Leyte Gulf
Stephen Spender: "I Think continually of Those Who Were Truly Great
Lord Tennyson: "Charge of the Light Brigade"