The strategic consulting firm Stratfor posted a 7-page analysis of conditions inside China on the eve of the Olympics, for which a nervous China announced plans to limit Internet access, even for reporters covering the Games. It is an intriguing assessment, finding that there probably are internal tensions within the Chinese government that could lead to a lengthy crackdown after the Olympics, even at the expense of economic growth. A stable, growing China has been a prime assumption for many policy types. Cutting visas and shutting down many firms for a full quarter bespeak of much turmoil, the report says. There is rising friction between provincial governments and Beijing. This is a fine report, reprinted with Stratfor's permission.
China, the Olympics and the Visa Mystery
July 29, 2008
By Rodger Baker
Something extraordinary is happening in China, and we are not
talking about the Olympics. Rather, Chinese officials have been
clamping down on visa applications and implementing bureaucratic
impediments to new and renewed visa applications under the guise of
pre-Olympic security.
In some ways, Beijing’s plan for a safe and secure Olympics appears
based on the premise that if no one shows up, there can be no trouble.
But placing restrictions on the movement of managers and employees of
foreign businesses operating in China, even if for a limited time as
Chinese officials have been at pains to reassure, makes little sense
from the standpoint of gaining political and economic benefits from hosting the Olympics. Something just isn’t right.
The Post-’70s Economic Framework
Since China’s economic reform and opening in the late 1970s, China’s
economic policy — and thus the basis for the overall development of the
nation — has been based on a simple two-part framework. First, draw in as much foreign investment
as possible and use the money and technology to strengthen China while
using the subsequent economic leverage to secure China. And second,
encourage growth for growth’s sake to ensure an ever-increasing flow of
money through the system to provide employment and social services to a
massive and urbanizing population.
Key to this policy
has been creating a very open environment for foreign businesses, which
bring money, technology and expertise and use their influence with
their own governments to keep stable international relations with China
— hence reducing international and economic frictions and increasing
the efficiency of the supply chain. For more than two decades, Chinese
national strategy has thus revolved around the principle of encouraging
investment, joint ventures and wholly-owned foreign enterprises in
China. There have been two foundations for this strategy: the evolution
of financial facilities for transferring and controlling foreign money
with a level of transparency nearing international standards, and the
ease of movement of personnel in and out of China.
It is this latter point that recently has been hit the hardest.
Over the past several months as the Beijing Olympics drew nearer, the
Chinese government has effectively frozen up most financial reform
plans. It also has issued a raft of new security measures not entirely
unlike other host cities in the post 9/11 security environment. But
China has gone several steps further than its predecessor hosts,
placing official and bureaucratic impediments on visa applications.
This not only has targeted potential “troublemaking” rights advocates,
it has also impacted foreign businesses ranging from invited guests to
the Olympic games to managers and employees of foreign companies in
China.
Business and the New Visa Hassles
The visa restrictions in particular have been a source of angst for
foreign businesses and business associations. Many smaller operations
may circumvent Chinese regulations and travel on tourist visas
(provided they can still obtain them). And there are ways around the
tighter regulations or bureaucratic hurdles if one has the right
connections or the willingness to apply several times or from different
locations. But multinational corporations are less willing to
jeopardize their operations by skirting the laws. Instead, they are
making their concerns known to Beijing and hoping that restrictions are
eased in September, as Beijing has rumored and hinted will occur.
In general, these visa restrictions have been brushed aside by
foreign observers as simply paranoia on China’s part regarding protests
or terrorist attacks during the Olympics. In many ways, however, this
makes little sense. First and most obvious, the Olympics were supposed
to highlight the opening of China — not restrict the very people who
have made China a key part of the global economy. Second, imposing
tight restrictions in Shanghai, the center of the Chinese
foreign-domestic economic nexus, makes little sense on grounds of Olympic security
since Shanghai is playing only a minor role in the games compared to
Beijing and Qingdao. (Think shutting down visas to New York during the
Atlanta games in the name of security, though Shanghai admittedly is
hosting some soccer matches.)
Shutting down business visas to keep terrorists out makes little sense anyway — it is hard to imagine Uighur militants
traveling on business visas as representatives of foreign
multinationals. Furthermore, by restricting business visas — even if
not across the board in a coherent fashion — China is putting a massive
strain not only on the ability of businesses to trust Chinese
regulations and business relations with the government, but also on the
fluidity of the global supply chain. Shutting down or impeding visas
affects much more than delaying the movement of a single individual
into China; it impacts the ability of multinational corporations to
move, replace or supplement managers and dealmakers in China. A delayed
visa applications of just three months still represents an entire
quarter that multinational corporations cannot reliably manage their
businesses operations i n China, and that doesn’t take into account the
visa backlog when restrictions are loosened or lifted.
Disrupting an integral part of the global economy for a full quarter
because of an international exposition makes little sense. The Germans
in 1936 didn’t do it, the Russians in 1980 didn’t — no one has. One
doesn’t simply shut down international business transactions for three
months or more to stop a terrorist — and particularly not China, which
depends on foreign direct investment. This is not simply an
inconvenience for some people: It is the imposition of friction on a
part of the system that is supposed to be frictionless. And it is not
merely individuals who are affected, but the relations between mammoth
companies.
A Period of Erratic Policies
China’s behavior has been erratic for several months now, if not for
the past few years, with the implementation of new and often
contradictory security and economic policies.
These have all been brushed aside as somehow related to preparation for
the Olympics. But they are in fact anomalous. China’s behavior is not
that of a country trying to show its best side for the international
community, nor that of a nation simply concerned about potential
terrorist or public relations threats to the Olympic games. In another
two months, after the Olympics and Paralympics have ended, it will
become clearer whether this was a spate of excessive paranoia or a
reflection of a much more significant crisis facing the Chinese
leadership — and the evidence increasingly points toward the latter.
As mentioned, China’s economic policies
in the reform and opening era have been based on the idea of growth.
This in many ways simply reflects the Asian economic model of
maintaining cheap lending policies at home, subsidizing exports,
flowing money through the system and focusing on revenue rather than
profits. In essence, it is growth for the sake of growth. This was the
policy of Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. And it
led each of those countries to a final crisis point, striking Japan
first in the early 1990s and the rest of the Asian tigers a few years
later. But China managed to avoid each of the previous Asian economic
crises points, as it was on the lagging end of growth and investment
curves.
Following the Asian economic crisis, China fully recovered from the
international stigma of Tiananmen Square and became the global economic
darling. By the time the 21st century rolled around, China was already
taking on the mantle of the Japanese and other Asians. It began to be
labeled both an economic miracle and a rising power; a future challenge to U.S. economic dominance
with all the political ramifications that brought. Were it not for
9/11, Washington would have squared off with Beijing to prevent the
so-called China rise. The reprieve of international pressure that came
when U.S. attention turned squarely toward Afghanistan and then Iraq
freed China’s leaders from an external stress that could have brought
about a very different set of economic and political decisions.
With the United States preoccupied, and no other major power really
challenging China, Beijing shifted its attention to domestic issues,
and its review quickly revealed the stresses to the system. These did
not primarily come from “splittist” forces like the Tibetans or the
Falun Gong, but rather from the economic policies that had brought
China from the Third World to the center of the global economic system.
Beijing is well-aware that should it continue with its current economic policies,
it will face the same risk of crisis as Japan, South Korea and the rest
of Asia. It is also aware that growing internal challenges — from the
spread and invasiveness of corruption to geographic economic imbalances, from rising social unrest to massive dislocation of populations ̵
2; are causing immediate problems.
Economics from Mao to Hu
Mao Zedong built a China designed to be self-sufficient and
massively redundant. Every province, every city, every factory was
supposed to be a self-contained unit, making the country capable of
weathering nearly any military attack. Deng Xiaoping didn’t get rid of
these redundancies when he opened the economy to foreign investment.
Instead, he and his successors encouraged local officials to work to attract foreign investment
and technology so as to raise China’s economic standard more rapidly.
By the time Jiang Zemin was in power it had become clear that the
regionally and locally driven economic policies threatened to throw
China back into its old cycle of decentralization — and, ultimately,
competing centers of power. Attempts by Jiang to correct this through
the Go West program, for example, came to naught after meeting massive
resistance in the wealthy c oastal provinces. The central government
accordingly backed off, shifting its attention to reclaiming
centralized authority over the military.
Hu Jintao has sought once again to try to address the problem of the
concentration of economic power in China’s coastal provinces and cities
through his Harmonious Society initiative. The idea is to redistribute
wealth and economic power, regain central authority over the economy,
and at the same time reduce redundancies and inefficiencies in the
Chinese economy. With minimal external interference, Hu was able to
test policies that by their very nature were going to sacrifice
short-term social stability in the name of long-term economic stability.
Growth was replaced by sustainability as the target; longer-term
redistribution of economic growth engines would replace short-term
employment and social stability.
This was a risky proposition, and one that met strong resistance in
China. But the alternative was to sit back and wait for the inevitable
economic crisis and the social repercussions thereto. In some ways, Hu
was suggesting that China risk stability in the short term to preserve
stability in the long run. But Hu didn’t anticipate the massive surge
in global commodity prices, particularly of food and oil. This was
compounded by increased international scrutiny over China’s human
rights record ahead of the Olympics, natural disasters
hitting at the availability and distribution of goods, a rise in
domestic social unrest triggered by local government policies and
economic corruption, several attempted and successful attacks against China’s transportation infrastructure, and
the uprising in Tibet.
Thus, the already-risky policies the central government was pursuing
suddenly looked more destructive than constructive from the point of
view of continued rule by the Communist Party of China (CPC).
The global economic slowdown was the external impetus China feared —
something that could undermine the flow of capital and leave Beijing
unable to control the outcome of a reduction in the inflow of capital.
At the same time, the internal social tensions triggered both by Hu’s
attempts to reshape the Chinese economy and by the slow pace of those
changes created a crisis for the Chinese leadership. It was hard enough
internally to control a measured economic slowdown to reshape the
economic structure of China, but quite another thing altogether to have
such a slowdown imposed on China from outside at the very moment social
stability was in a critical state at home.
A Government in Crisis
China’s rapid and contradictory economic and security policies,
rising social tensions, and seemingly counterproductive visa
regulations appear to be signs of a government in crisis.
They are the reactionary policies of a central leadership trying to
preserve its authority, stabilize social stability and postpone an
economic crisis. At the same time, we see signs that the local
governments, and even organs of the central government, are putting up
steady resistance to the announcements coming from Beijing. Slapping
restrictions on foreign businessmen may make little sense from a
broader business continuity sense, but if the point is to begin
breaking the backs of the local governments — whose strength lies in
their relations with foreign businesses — then the moves may make more
sense.
If the central government has reached the point that it is willing
to risk its international business role to rein in wayward local
officials, however, then the Chinese leadership sees a major crisis
looming or already under way. It is one thing to toss out a few local
leaders and replace them, quite another to undermine the structure of
the Chinese economy for the sake of regaining control over local
officials. But if Chinese history since 1949 (and really quite a ways
before) is any guide, the core of the CPC leadership is willing to
sacrifice social and economic stability to preserve power. One need
only look at the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution or the
crackdown at Tiananmen Square for evidence of this. Revolution is not,
after all, a dinner party, and maintaining CPC control is paramount to
the government.
After each major revolution or crisis, China eventually has recovered. The Cultural Revolution was followed by diplomatic relations with the United States,
Tiananmen Square was put aside as China joined the World Trade
Organization and surged ahead in gross domestic product (GDP).
Certainly, there was change among the leadership and in the way the
party dealt with policies at home and abroad. But if there is the
likelihood of loss of control due to an impending economic crisis,
better to have some role in shaping the crisis to preserve the chance
of maintaining a role in the future political structure than to sit by
and try to clean up as things fall apart. The Party in fact has a long
history of taking a self-generated crisis/revolution over an externally
or domestically initiated one.
It may be that the contradictory policies Beijing is tossing around
these days will simply fade away after September and things will get
back to “normal.” But already, Chinese officials are downplaying the
previously hyped political and economic benefits of the Olympic games.
They are now warning that economic conditions may not be so strong in
the future, and at least internally discussing the distinct possibility
that at least certain regions of China are facing the same economic
crises faced by their mentors Japan, South Korea and the Asian tigers.
Internal Crises vs. the Economy
A recent article in the Global Times, a paper that addresses myriad
topics of domestic and international significance and is read among
China’s leaders, discussed how economics is not the best measure of
strength. It referred to the overall comparative GDP and the size of
China’s military in the late 1800s. Then, China was considered at its
weakest, but from an economic or military perspective it could have
been considered comparable to the global powers of the day. This hints
at the deeper internal debate in Beijing, where true national strength
and the role of the economy is under discussion. Assumptions that China
is only focused on continued good economic ties with the world
shouldn’t be taken as gospel — China has a track record of shutting
down external connections when internal crises brew.
Numerous polices are being thrown around in firefighting fashion,
including blocking or at least hindering foreign business movement in
and out of the country and tightening the flow of foreign capital in
both directions. They are coming in reaction to flare-ups in economic,
environmental, public relations and social arenas. Energy policies are
making less sense, imbalances in supply and demand are growing and
seemingly contradictory policies are being issued. Social unrest, or at
least local media coverage of such unrest,
seems to be increasing; either is a sign of weakening control. Local
officials are still failing to fall in line with central government
edicts. Strategic state enterprises like China National Petroleum
Corp., China Petroleum & Chemical Corp. and the China Development Bank
are all defyi ng state-council orders — and the State Council itself is
apparently going head-to-head with major policy bodies long given
control over economic policies.
Something extraordinary is happening in China. And while not
everyone may want that to be the case, and so have sought to use the
Olympics to explain things away, the easy explanation simply doesn’t
make enough sense.