The Afghan War drags on, as Americans turn inward, and Islamists press on. What will Team Obama do, and can it work?
Administration Policy. Begin with A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, an address by President Obama. Here is the March 27 White House Press Briefing on the new strategy for the region. And here is the March 27 MacNeil Lehrer Online NewsHour interview with General David Petraeus & special regional envoy Richard Holbrooke.
President Obama's speech summarizes his view of things in seven crisp paragraphs:
Many people in the United States - and many in partner countries that have sacrificed so much - have a simple question: What is our purpose in Afghanistan? After so many years, they ask, why do our men and women still fight and die there? They deserve a straightforward answer.
So let me be clear: al Qaeda and its allies - the terrorists who planned and supported the 9/11 attacks - are in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Multiple intelligence estimates have warned that al Qaeda is actively planning attacks on the U.S. homeland from its safe-haven in Pakistan. And if the Afghan government falls to the Taliban - or allows al Qaeda to go unchallenged - that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can.
The future of Afghanistan is inextricably linked to the future of its neighbor, Pakistan. In the nearly eight years since 9/11, al Qaeda and its extremist allies have moved across the border to the remote areas of the Pakistani frontier. This almost certainly includes al Qaeda's leadership: Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. They have used this mountainous terrain as a safe-haven to hide, train terrorists, communicate with followers, plot attacks, and send fighters to support the insurgency in Afghanistan. For the American people, this border region has become the most dangerous place in the world.
But this is not simply an American problem - far from it. It is, instead, an international security challenge of the highest order. Terrorist attacks in London and Bali were tied to al Qaeda and its allies in Pakistan, as were attacks in North Africa and the Middle East, in Islamabad and Kabul. If there is a major attack on an Asian, European, or African city, it - too - is likely to have ties to al Qaeda's leadership in Pakistan. The safety of people around the world is at stake.
For the Afghan people, a return to Taliban rule would condemn their country to brutal governance, international isolation, a paralyzed economy, and the denial of basic human rights to the Afghan people - especially women and girls. The return in force of al Qaeda terrorists who would accompany the core Taliban leadership would cast Afghanistan under the shadow of perpetual violence.
As President, my greatest responsibility is to protect the American people. We are not in Afghanistan to control that country or to dictate its future. We are in Afghanistan to confront a common enemy that threatens the United States, our friends and allies, and the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan who have suffered the most at the hands of violent extremists.
So I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. That is the goal that must be achieved. That is a cause that could not be more just. And to the terrorists who oppose us, my message is the same: we will defeat you.
44 believes that the peoples there want the same kind of life we do, a debatable proposition. He reaffirmed his intent to take out "high-level" targets as opportunity arises from actionable intelligence. He proposes a minuscule aid package--$1.5B over 5 years--for Pakistan. He notes American losses of 700 dead in the 7-plus Afghan War years. Finally, he wants a new "Contact Group" that includes...lran, Russia & China, nations whose interests in Southwest Asia are by no means congruent with ours--indeed, often opposed. Such a coalition will likely prove a recipe for foreign policy paralysis.
Yet this press conference exchange with two senior aides encapsulates the administration's commitment to defeat, rather than negotiate with, the Taliban:
Q The Taliban has come out with a statement in response to the
President this morning. They basically said that the U.S. is repeating
the mistakes of the Russians, and if winning the war by military power
worked then the Russians would still be in charge. I wonder if you
have any comment to that. And if that's the kind of rhetoric that
they're -- they sound like they're ready to fight. Is the U.S. ready
for casualties, more Afghan casualties? And how can the U.S. engage
with them in any productive way?
MR. RIEDEL: Let me comment on the Taliban. It's no surprise. We know
that the core Taliban leadership, led by Mullah Omar, is determined not
to negotiate with anybody. They want to take Afghanistan back to the
medieval hell that they created in the 1990s. But there are many of
the -- those involved in the insurgency who may not be so committed as
that, and if we see the momentum of the Taliban broken this summer and
over the course of the fighting season, we may see some fractures
within that movement. And I suspect that the core Taliban leadership
is very, very worried about just that kind of thing happening.
MS. FLOURNOY: And I would just further add that there's absolutely no
valid comparison between the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which
was an occupation to control a country, repress a population, install
their own sort of puppet leadership. We are there to, first and
foremost, combat terrorism and protect our own interests and our own
people from attack. But we're also there to help the Afghan people and
enable them to reclaim their country. There is absolutely no
comparison that's valid between the two.
Psywar is a major theme:
The way I think we've avoided it is that this is a not a straitjacket, a detailed blueprint. It's a framework within which there's plenty of flexibility to bring in ideas which are not in the report. One of the most important ideas in this report -- which is new for this country but has been done in many other wars, including Iraq -- is the information issue. We can -- in Swat, for example, there are about 150 illegal FM radio stations, and Fazlullah is going around every night broadcasting the names of people they're going to behead or they've beheaded. Any of you who have a sense of recent history know that that's exactly what happened with Radio Mille Collines in Rwanda, and the United States did nothing, to our eternal regret.
And nothing has been done so far about that. These are unimpeded. We have identified the information issue -- sometimes called psychological operations or strategic communication; used to have different names in the old days -- as a major, major gap to be filled. Senator Kerry is pushing this very hard from the Senate side. So this is the kind of thing that emerged from our discussions.
The MacNeil-Lehrer interview contains three nuggets. First, General Petraeus & Ambassador Holbrooke have spoken with the Pakistani ISI chief--the Inter-Services Intelligence agency intimately involved in playing both sides--about tamping down ISI aid to al-Qaeda. Second, the administration believes that Iran shares a common interest in regional stability with us, a highly dubious proposition; they gain more from our defeat than they would gain from more stability in Southwest Asia. Third, the administration sees evidence that most Afghans fighting under the Taliban banner are not doing so because they share the same goals. Consider this exchange:
MARGARET WARNER: Let me ask about something else President Obama put on the table a few weeks ago, which was negotiating with some elements of the Afghan Taliban. Today, he seemed to indicate that he is talking about lower-level elements. Yet, the Afghan government is talking -- I mean, President Karzai talked about the need to reach out to Mullah Omar. Is that a serious split between these two governments? And how do you propose to go about it?
GENERAL PETREAUS: There's actually something, which you know, I'm sure, in their constitution about the reintegration and reconciliation, if you will. Our sense is that it is most profitable, at this time, to pursue that at the lower, middle levels in local areas where, for a variety of different reasons, the Taliban has been able to muscle in, to buy their way in or to bring people to their side for ills against, perhaps, the local governance, even.
But in all those cases, there is an opportunity, we think, to split off the more hardcore and then to try to bring back, if you will, to the new Afghanistan, those others. Whether that's possible at the top, I think, is a bigger question indeed. And I think President Obama's description today was revealing.
AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Margaret, the majority of people fighting for the Taliban are not fighting for the precepts of returning to a 14th century caliphate or for Mullah Omar's precepts. They're fighting either because it's a gun culture and they -- and it's a long-standing thing, or because they've been misguided to thinking we're the latest round of foreign invaders rather than coming in to liberate them from the Taliban.
We think that's probably over 70 percent, according to polling. We have to find ways to give these people alternatives -- jobs in the agricultural sector. Make them understand that they've been misled by Mullah Omar and his core leadership.
GENERAL PETREAUS: I think it's very important, in fact, to stress that the Taliban brand, if you will, is still very damaged, as I'm sure you found in your several weeks in Afghanistan recently. But this also highlights the importance of not just more forces, but also the proper employment of those forces.
General McKiernan, for example, just issued counterinsurgency guidance to the ISAF U.S. forces in Afghanistan. That should govern the way our forces operate. We have to be seen as, actually, good guests. We have to be seen as, not conquerors, but as friends -- as there to help secure and to actually serve the people. And that is paramount as this goes forward.
Five Experts Weigh In. Now, five estimable, serious experts weigh in.
Ralph Peters sees 44 channeling LBJ in Vietnam: committing troops in excess ISO an unattainable goal of a pacified, democratic Afghanistan:
Obama rightly identified the main threat to us as al Qaeda, which he wants to "disrupt, dismantle and defeat." Then why are his efforts overwhelmingly directed toward the Taliban?
I don't like the Talibs, but they didn't attack us on 9/11. Dirt poor, they just made the mistake of renting some fleabag motel rooms to al Qaeda. And they paid heavily for it.
The Taliban strategy is to make Afghanistan ungovernable for us. What if, instead of trying to claim worthless territory in the name of a corruption-poisoned Afghan government, we flipped the rules and just kept Afghanistan ungovernable for the Taliban?
44 fails to see, writes RP, that Pakistan is not America's friend:
Start with his inane -- but touchingly American -- statement that "the people of Pakistan want the same things we want." Oh, really?
How many Post readers think Sharia law would be a good idea? How about beating the crap out of women just for yuks? Or stoning them to death because they smiled at the wrong time? And let's ban alcohol, bare arms, dating and jobs for women. And grow those beards, fellas!
Yeah, we're tight. We're such good buds that, while the Pakistanis protect the worst elements within the Taliban, manipulate our key supply line and pander to terrorists, Obama wants to guarantee Pakistan's stunningly corrupt politicians $1.5 billion in aid every year. Plus military aid.
Why on earth should the Pakistanis help us when we reward them lavishly for screwing us?
Turn now to ex-CNN reporter Peter Bergen (who in the late 1990s actually interviewed Osama bin Laden). He sees "graveyard myths"--the ghosts of Britain's mid-19th century defeat and the former Soviet Union's 1980s defeat-- affecting our Afghanistan policy. He notes that the British returned and won a second Afghan War late in the 19th century, and that the Afghans only defeated the Soviets with Arab money and American weapons. PB sees opportunity, given generally favorable attitudes among Afghans towards us, and substituting Afghans for Americans on the ground-level firing line:
The Soviet experience in Afghanistan weighed heavily on the minds of Bush administration policymakers, who kept a “light footprint” lest Afghans rebuff American and allied soldiers as hated occupiers. But as it turned out, the Afghans were widely enthusiastic about being liberated from the Taliban. In an ABC/BBC poll conducted in 2005, a full four years after the fall of the Taliban, 8 in 10 Afghans expressed a favorable opinion of the United States — an extraordinary proportion in a Muslim nation — and the same number supported the American-led overthrow of the Taliban in their country.
And just last month, in a new poll by ABC and the BBC, 58 percent of Afghans named the Taliban as the greatest threat to their nation. Only 8 percent said it was the United States. And while only 47 percent of Afghans still had a favorable opinion of America, the Taliban fared far worse, with just 7 percent approval.
What Afghans want is for international forces to do what they should have been doing all along — provide them the security they need to get on with making a living. That means building up the Afghan Army and police, which are only about one-fourth the size of the security services in Iraq. This will not come cheap, but the cost of putting an Afghan soldier in the field is only one-seventieth that of sending an American. President Obama, who will travel to Europe for NATO’s 60th anniversary in early April, can ask those European countries that are reluctant to send additional troops to Afghanistan to instead contribute to a permanent fund to help pay for the expanded Afghan security services.
Author-journalist Robert Kaplan says that saving Afghanistan is achievable. He concedes that the Karzai government is weak, but so are the Taliban. He sums up twin historical legacies competing for supremacy in today's 21st century Afghanistan:
There is nothing ancient about Afghanistan. It came into existence only in the early 18th century as a buffer between the civilizations of Persia and the Indian Subcontinent. It soon became a buffer between the Czarist empire in Russia and the British Empire in India. The very situation in Afghanistan today, with different spheres of influence being carved out behind the screen of daily warfare, attests to this history. In the south and east, the radical Islamist insurgency is itself a reassertion of the concept of Pushtunistan on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In particular, Baluchistan in the south is becoming a Wild West area of arms bazaars and opium labs. (In fact, most armed insurgents in Afghanistan were trained not in Pakistan’s tribal areas but in Pakistani Baluchistan, further proof that no solution here is possible without military action inside Pakistan.) In Afghanistan’s northeast, tribes in Kunar and Nuristan will fight any outsider, even those from the next valley. In the north, where it is more peaceful, trade is intensifying the links between ethnic-Tajiks and Uzbeks who straddle the border between Afghanistan and the former Soviet Central Asian republics. Western Afghanistan is coming under the political and economic domination of Iran, which supplies the city of Herat with electricity, even as the Iranian rial is the main currency in circulation. The Iranians are sending arms and military trainers into this part of Afghanistan. While the Shiite Iranians are against a takeover of Afghanistan by the Sunni extremist Taliban, they also want to keep Afghanistan weak, and to bleed the Americans as much as they can. (The Spanish contingent of several hundred NATO troops in western Badghis province—in the heart of Afghani Greater Iran—practically never leaves its base.)
And yet set against this whole legacy is another tendency, equally as compelling. Throughout the mid-part of the 20th century, Afghanistan had a credible central government under King Zahir Shah that boasted many accomplishments from eradicating malaria to overseeing the construction of a ring road uniting the major cities. Following the chaos of the early- and mid-1990s that came with the collapse of the Soviet puppet regime of Mohammed Najibullah, Afghans yearned so much for a central government that they initially welcomed the tyranny of the Taliban. And today, all polls indicate that Afghans want strong national leadership emanating from Kabul. Indeed, there is a hue and cry for roads, wells, culverts, dams, and other infrastructure that can help with farming. The problem is that decades of strife, in which central authority went from monarchy to communism, to anarchy, to theocracy, to enfeebled democracy, have left tribal affiliations as the only constant.
The scale of Afghan military buildup needed will siphon off potential talent for the civilian sector. It is illusion, the American military informs us, to think we can simply pull out and neutralize terrorists via air-strikes alone. RK sums up:
“This is not easy shit,” says one American Army colonel. “But what’s the alternative?” That’s why American Brig. Gen. John Nicholson, Jr. says that what is required is “strategic patience.” The U. S. military has already been in Afghanistan half as many years as it was in Vietnam, and with troops pulling out of Iraq and talk of a multi-year hard slog ahead here, Afghanistan is on track to becoming America’s longest war. To that end, significant numbers of American officers and civilian contractors will be embedded in Afghan government ministries for years to come, helping to run things. But does the home front have the stomach for it? Our reaction to the fighting about to unfold this summer will speak volumes.
A fourth expert view (actually from a pair of national security mavens) warns that Pakistan is the true linchpin of an Afghan strategy (agreeing on this point with Ralph Peters). They write:
Consider a hypothetical. Had the terrorist attacks of 9/11 been planned by al Qaeda from its current headquarters in ungoverned areas of Pakistan, is it conceivable that today the U.S. would find itself with 54,000 troops and $180 billion committed to transforming medieval Afghanistan into a stable, modern nation?
For Afghanistan to become a unitary state ruled from Kabul, and to develop into a modern, prosperous, poppy-free and democratic country would be a worthy and desirable outcome. But it is not vital for American interests.
And add:
The problem in Pakistan is more pressing and direct. There, the U.S. does have larger vital national interests. Top among these is preventing Pakistan's arsenal of nuclear weapons and materials from falling into the hands of terrorists such as Osama bin Laden. This danger is not hypothetical -- the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, A.Q. Khan, is now known to have been the world's first nuclear black marketer, providing nuclear weapons technology and materials to Libya, North Korea and Iran.
Protecting Pakistan's nuclear arsenal requires preventing radical Islamic extremists from taking control of the country.
Furthermore, the U.S. rightly remains committed to preventing the next 9/11 attack by eliminating global terrorist threats such as al Qaeda. This means destroying their operating headquarters and training camps, from which they can plan more deadly 9/11s.
A fifth expert gave a briefing on the opium problem in Afghanistan, that I attended recently. As it was off the record, I cannot reveal the source. The briefer noted re the drug wars in Afghanistan that al-Qaeda forces many farmers to grow opium (Afghanistan supplies 90 percent of the world total), and that absent security we cannot get farmers to stop growing it. They would be killed for doing so, as they could not pay the tax imposed upon them by the terrorists. Buying up the crop would not work, either, because the farmers would be killed for denying al-Qaeda its levy, and because other sections of the country where opium is not grown now would see growth in supply to be sold then to Uncle Sucker.
So who is right in all this? Frankly, I do not know. But I do know one thing: Defeat in Afghanistan would, as with defeat in Iraq, be a foreign policy catastrophe for America, and would surely energize jihadi worldwide. Thus, so long as victory appears achievable, we owe it to ourselves to try.
Bottom Line. America can sustain participation in the conflict so long as three prerequisites are met: (1) low casualties; (2) tolerable demand on resources--both human and material; (3) an acceptable, clear strategic goal. Casualties could spike this summer, and if the spike is too high, Team 44 may well exit stage left. Further deepening of our economic distress could make even a light burden seem heavy, although pulling out would, in the longer run, prove penny-wise and pound-foolish. As for a goal, denying al-Qaeda the ability to plan and captain attacks from Afghanistan suffices. If, on top of that, we can get functioning, moderate civil government, that is even better, but such is a desirable, not an absolutely necessary, goal.
Remember above all: We did not lose the Vietnam War on the battlefield. We lost it in America's living rooms, among the political elites who turned decisively against the war in 1968. Our soldiers did not fail us; we failed them. Our soldiers today think that they can prevail in Afghanistan. So let's give them every chance to do so.