Former WSJ Moscow's bureau chief Claudia Rosett sees Team Obama in Russia and elsewhere abetting the undermining of the democracy agenda promoted by President Bush. Obama is so busy apologizing for America's past that he skips the good:
[M]issing from Obama's philosophy is the immense role played by the U.S. America stood for decades as a bulwark of freedom. Americans fought real wars in such places as Korea and Vietnam. Americans kept brilliantly alive a philosophy of democratic government and free markets, which offered a beacon to oppressed people of the world, and exported both ideas and inventions that have vastly enriched mankind.
Obama's eagerness to "reset" relations has led him to overlook ominous trends towards highly illiberal pseudo-democracy--including in Russia:
The legitimacy of genuine democracy is hijacked via concepts such as "sovereign democracy" in Russia, "people's democracy" in China and "religious democracy" in Iran--all homes to state-controlled mass media, especially via the outlet of television. This report notes that the notion of democracy, in this murky landscape, becomes "a semantic shell for each authoritarian ruler to fill as he pleases." Is this what America now proposes to converge and collaborate with?
There is a great deal more illuminating detail in these case studies, but they boil down to a warning that despots of the modern world are already quite busy with their own reset of the global system: "Authoritarian regimes are eroding the international rules and standards built up by the democratic world over the past several decades, threatening to export the instability and abuses that their systems engender." In this setting, what the world needs from America is not a reset button, but a rudder.
CR cites a recent Freedom House/RL/RFA study, "Undermining Democracy" (June 2009), which assesses how the governments of China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia and Venezuela are using sophisticated strategies and tactics to redefine democracy so as to cloak authoritarian rule. The study notes, chillingly, that for the first time since Freedom House began compiling the state of human rights globally in 1972, civil liberties have declined globally for three consecutive years.
Highlights of this brilliant, disturbing study follow. (Sorry for formatting problems in transferring .pdf text; I could nto invest hours fixing them. It is nonetheless readable.)
General Trends & Common Traits. Smart tyrannies are using modern technologies and practical tactics to strategically advance illiberal ideas with considerable skill and, consequently, success. They are: (1) redefining democracy to include undemocratic rule; (2) monitoring the Internet to detect dissenters; (3) using foreign aid to help foreign dictatorships; (4) attacking and undermining international organizations that promote liberal democracy; (5) brainwashing their youth. Rule is by a dedicated cadre. While citizens have more access to information and more freedom to travel than in earlier times, they are watched. So long as they do not challenge the authority of the regime they usually are safe. But if they do, and fail to respond to persuasion or milder forms of coercion, they may face torture or even be killed: "Loyalists are rewarded, enemies are punished, the neutral are neglected or casually abused, and all of these labels are assigned in an arbitrary and capricious manner."
China: Resilient, Sophisticated Authoritarianism. China is becoming both model and mentor to other illiberal regimes worldwide. Its own brand of governance combines economic growth and Han (the majority Chinese ethnic group) chauvinism. It is vulnerable, should economic growth falter, and fears those chasing under dictatorial rule.
The study explains how education is used to manipulate even China's best and brightest youth:
"An important element in this guidance is the selective erasure of history. The disasters of
late Maoism—the Great Leap famine and the Cultural Revolution—left a powerful legacy
that continues to influence Chinese values and public ethics. (Much of this influence comes
in the form of recoil, from extreme asceticism and public idealism to extreme materialism
and public cynicism, for example.) Yet today it remains difficult or impossible to discuss the
Mao era forthrightly in any public context. In the spectacular review of Chinese history that
formed part of the opening ceremonies for the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, the world’s
gaze was led across the ancient dynasties to the triumph of the Communist revolution in
1949, only to skip abruptly to “reform and opening” in the late 1970s. The true history of the
Mao era—like the histories of Tibet, Taiwan, World War II, and the CCP itself—is routinely
airbrushed from textbooks and other media, replaced only by names, dates, and manipula-
tive slogans. Young Chinese today may be very well educated in mathematics, engineering,
or foreign languages and yet live with badly warped understandings of their own country’s
past. Even worse, they could remain entirely unaware of how they have been cheated.
"Thoughtwork is performed through language, and the language it employs would be rec-
ognizable to George Orwell. Political pressure on an individual is
called help; the violation of rights is described as the protection of
rights; the state controls workers through what
are nominally labor unions; suppressing the Uyghur population is called counterterrorism;
authoritarianism is dubbed democracy; real democracy movements are denounced as coun-
terrevolutionary rebellions; and a system of servile courts is hailed as the rule of law. The
language of CCP thoughtwork adheres to the concept of the Big Lie, a gross falsehood that
is repeated without challenge until it is accepted as truth—or something that, for political
purposes, is just as solid as truth. Political power in China depends upon maintaining a cer-
tain moral pose even if everyone involved knows on some level that the pose is hypocritical."
Iran: Clerical Authoritarianism. The Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the most despotic on the planet. Its insular leadership cadre competes in "apartheid democracy" elections, while the larger public has no access to power. Iran, lacking China's economic growth engine, pays out an estimated $70 to $100B annually in subsidies to buy off popular discontent. The official ideology is aimed at remaking Iranian society:
"In keeping with its pseudo-totalitarian nature, the regime has sought to forge a new
Islamic man or woman—pious, loyal, and xenophobic, particularly with respect to the
United States and Israel. It simultaneously tries to foster a discourse of democracy that
borrows structural elements from the Soviet side of the Cold War ideological debate. It
offers what it calls genuine Islamic democracy, arguing that this form of governance protects
the true interests of the underclass (mostazafan). As with Plato’s philosopher kings and the
visionary leaders of Soviet communism, Iran’s benevolent rulers are said to have access
to higher truths that enable them to govern more successfully than the common man. The
most important of these leaders, of course, is the Valiye-Fagih (Guardian Jurist or Supreme
Leader), whose wisdom and legitimacy are both of divine origin. This ideal “democracy”
is set up in opposition to what the regime dismisses as the bogus, bourgeois democracy of the West, where a liberal veneer covers the despotic nature of a system that caters to the
rich (the mostakbarin, or arrogant ones). The Islamic Republic has deftly used pictures and
reports from the war in Iraq to argue that liberal democracy begets chaos. Similarly, offi -
cially controlled media have celebrated the recent financial crisis as the death knell of liberal
democracy, and Russia’s invasion of Georgia has been touted as the last nail in the coffin of
America’s insidious democracy-promotion scheme."
Because Iran is a "bellwether" state in the Mideast, and seeks to spread its brand of Shia tyranny into majority Sunni states, Saudi Arabia (majority Sunni) has entered into a "veritable cold war" to counter Iranian regional influence.
Pakistan: Semi-Authoritarian, Failed State. Since the state's 1948 bloody birth, the military and democratic elements have been at odds, with clerics joining the anti-democratic forces. Pakistani society is riven by continuing civil strife:
"The political class in Pakistan is still dominated by the owners of large landed estates,
who are far from consistent democrats. Their participation in the electoral process is essen-
tially aimed at preserving their traditional power of patronage over a largely poor and illit-
erate rural populace. All efforts at land reform based on agricultural efficiency and social
justice have fallen foul of this “feudal” class, who have been able to manipulate the system
to their advantage and ensure their continued dominance of political, economic, and social
life in the countryside.
"The industrial and business sector in Pakistan owes its emergence and prosperity to state
largesse. Such a “hothouse” entrepreneurial class lacks the political vision and economic inde-
pendence to support democracy, the optimal political infrastructure for the growth of private
commerce. There is no evidence that any signifi cant part of this class has ever resisted military
intervention or dominance of the political agenda. They are clearly wedded to an authoritarian
dispensation, so long as their links to the state are intact and their short-term profi ts are secure.
"The class of mullahs has its own agenda: to ensure that there is no deviation from what
has incrementally become the leitmotif of Pakistan: an Islamic state that is theoretically
founded on the principles enunciated in the Koran and the Sunnah. Starting from General
Zia ul-Haq’s period in power (1977–88), the decade of the 1980s saw a mushroom growth
of madrassas (religious schools or seminaries) funded largely by Saudi donations. When
Pakistan was founded in 1947, there were only 189 madrassas in the country, divided between
various competing schools of Islamic jurisprudence. By 2002, however, there were between
10,000 and 13,000 unregistered madrassas with 1.7 to 1.9 million students. In 2008, one
estimate put the number of madrassas at over 40,000. This bumper crop of religious schools
with a particular ideological bent produced generations of jihadi extremists among the mil-
lions of Afghan refugees on Pakistani soil (from whom the Taliban eventually emerged),
but also among Pakistani youth who undertook such training. Today’s suicide bombers, and
arguably the fl ow of fresh recruits who replace them, owe their origins to these seminaries.
"In addition to traditional Islamic teaching, the madrassa curriculums in question tend to
inculcate a rejection of anything to do with “the West,” and a narrow interpretation of their
school of jurisprudence that tends to strengthen (violent) religious sectarianism.
Given these illiberal forces within the ruling classes, the holding of elections and the
lip service to democracy in Pakistan’s political discourse appear insufficient to nudge the
country toward a state built on genuine democratic principles. A transformation of that kind
would require an unprecedented popular mobilization to shake off the benighted defenders
of the status quo."
Russia: Selective Capitalism and Kleptocracy. Russia tyranny has taken a distinct shape:
"The core characteristics of Russian authoritarianism in its post-Soviet maturity are
selectively capitalist kleptocracy, the dominance of informal influence groups, decorative
democracy, and illiberal ideology. Together, these elements form an effective mechanism for
maintaining elite control over a disempowered populace."
Russia is a case of popular democratic revolution (1991) hijacked by ruling elites, and approaching foreign policy in 19th century fashion:
"A transition did take place, but it was not to the hoped-for liberal democracy grounded
in a free-market economy and the rule of law. Instead, it was a shift from the failing yet
still functional bureaucratic authoritarianism of the late-Soviet period to a fl ashier, more
footloose authoritarianism that rests on selectively capitalist kleptocracy, the dominance
of informal influence groups, a decorative democracy that is often described as “man-
aged,” and officially encouraged attempts to create a new and profoundly illiberal ideol-
ogy with mass appeal. This system began to take shape under Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s, matured under Vladimir Putin in the 2000s, and received a tremendous shot in the arm as
oil prices rose and the Kremlin’s coffers swelled. The regime has developed an elaborate
and mostly effective toolbox of repressive and manipulative measures for maintaining
domestic control, a conceptual vocabulary for faking democracy, and a series of strategies
for wielding international influence.
"The world’s democracies must navigate the shoals of this system’s contradictions as
they fashion policies toward Russia along three major axes. The first is the advancement of
common interests. These are few, as Russia’s ruling elite, whatever rhetorical flourishes it
may occasionally adopt for foreign ears, views the world in terms of 19th-century territorial
spheres of influence, approaches international relations as a zero-sum game, and has staked
much of its legitimacy—more than most outside observers seem to realize—on opposition to
an American bogeyman, a “West” that is allegedly bent on Russia’s destruction. The second
axis is a response to the threats Russia poses to its neighbors. These are numerous, ranging
from the encouragement of dictatorial regimes and the export of high-level corruption, to
political meddling and even military intervention in countries deemed by the Kremlin to
have misbehaved. Finally, the third axis is an attempt to mitigate the danger of systemic
failure in Russia itself. This possibility is quite real, and its occurrence will be difficult to
predict or prevent."
The state uses schools and media to inculcate its message:
"The Kremlin deploys the conceptual vocabulary of the new Russia—national renewal, nos-
talgia, anti-Western xenophobia, sovereign democracy—through a sophisticated domestic
communications strategy that marshals both the traditional resources of the state and much-
expanded control over virtually all mainstream mass media.11 This one-two punch, coming
amid a period of rising prosperity after a disastrous decade, has had a significant impact on
popular opinion, and the Kremlin’s message has resonated with its intended recipients.
"The traditional resources of the state include official pronouncements, the restoration of
Soviet symbols, adjustments to school curriculums, the establishment of a ruling party, and
the creation of youth movements. In 2005, Putin stressed in his “state of the nation” address
to parliament that Russia “will decide for itself the pace, terms, and conditions of moving
towards democracy”; he used the same speech to describe the collapse of the Soviet Union
as the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century. By that time, the familiar
strains of the Soviet national anthem were sounding once again at official gatherings (with
updated words penned by the author of the 1943 and 1977 versions). New history textbooks
and manuals for teachers laud Joseph Stalin, gloss over the murderous legacy of Soviet
communism, and represent the Putin era as a restoration of greatness that is imperiled by the
evil designs of Russia’s enemies. United Russia has a lock on the rubber-stamp parliament
and tentacles throughout the power structure. And a number of youth movements, funded
directly or indirectly by the Kremlin, act as capillaries to bring new blood into the elite,
cudgels to cow opponents, and bullhorns to blare approved messages. While the fate of this
enterprise is now unclear in light of reduced oil prices and a global economic crisis to which
Russia seems particularly vulnerable, it remains a signal accomplishment of the regime.
"Mainstream mass media, from nationwide television stations to major newspapers, are
now either under direct state control or owned by Kremlin-friendly business magnates. Violence against irksome reporters is routine, and a number of critical journalists, of whom
Anna Politkovskaya is the best known abroad, have been murdered with seeming impunity
in recent years. The official message resounds most clearly on television, where dissenting
voices are blacklisted; newspapers enjoy somewhat more freedom, but with the balance
clearly in favor of the Kremlin. Where the state does not have direct control, proxies like
Gazprom-Media, which owns television networks, radio stations, and newspapers, perform a
similar function, although they sometimes allow their holdings a longer leash, as Gazprom-
Media does with radio station Ekho Moskvy.
"The internet at first glance appears to contradict the rule, with independent voices readily
available in some outlets, and even flourishing on blogs. Yet cyberspace is also the focus of
increasing manipulation, with a vast array of Kremlin-funded websites promoting illiberal
ideologies and regime-friendly forces stepping up their ownership of key infrastructure, like
hosting sites for bloggers. And if web-based new media in functioning democracies have
improved access to information and forced mainstream media to become more competi-
tive, docile mainstream media in Russia simply ignore inconvenient online revelations and
discussions, cutting off the cycle of feedback and response that has enlivened the press and
enhanced accountability elsewhere."
Russia's influence is buoyed by petrodollars, and thus susceptible to reversal if oil prices again plummet and stay low.
Venezuela: Petro-Politics and the Promotion of Disorder. Hugo Chavez has sent petrodollars abroad--frequently, though, without attaching strings, and thus often promoting merely corruption and disorder:
"Since taking power in 1999, Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez Frías has managed to con-
vert a frail but nonetheless pluralistic democracy into a semi-authoritarian regime. Certain
freedoms continue to exist, and elections are still held, but the system of checks and balances
has become inoperative. The government rarely negotiates with opposition forces, the state
insists on undermining the autonomy of civil society, the law is invoked mostly to penalize
opponents and never to curtail the government, and the electoral field is uneven, with the
ruling party making use of state resources that are systematically denied to the opposition.
"These conditions are all typical of electoral autocracies. However, the Venezuelan regime
also seems to rely on a practice that is more peculiar to Chavismo, as the Chávez phenom-
enon is commonly known, or at least to a small subset of semi-authoritarian states: the pro-
motion of disorder. Whereas many nondemocratic governments—such as those in Russia,
China, and Saudi Arabia—seek political legitimacy by attempting to deliver order, the rulers
of Venezuela and their ilk do nothing to stop lawlessness. Consequently, ordinary citizens
live in fear of random crime, oppositionists face targeted attacks by thugs, and businesses
are subject to violence by government-sponsored labor groups. This intimidation through
third parties, rather than through direct state pressure alone, helps to discourage collective
action by regime opponents. It also produces discontent, but not among the protected class
of Chavistas."
Chavez uses three tactics to amass power: smash the middle, politicize social services, mobilize "new" voters. He subsidizes groups lavishly, augments same with off-budget funding, uses the military to consolidate control and censors speech. Anti-Americanism plus anti-Saudi petro-politics are part of a rogue state along the style of 1961-1989 Cuba. Social spending abroad is a foreign policy tool aimed at spreading influence and co-opting foreign intellectuals. Alliances with Iran, Russia and China round out the picture.
By destroying term limits, Chavez eliminated the constitutional safeguard that many Latin American democracies adopted, because of their history of military dictatorship. Chavez's motto is that of one caudillo (Spanish for "military leader"): "For my friends, everything...for my enemies, the law."
Bottom Line. A sad truism about technology is that it is often value-neutral: It may equally be used by the best and the worst--for noble and evil purposes alike. The fax machine helped free Eastern Europe in 1989 and Russia in 1991. A globalized Internet helped liberate Ukraine and Georgia in 2004, and Lebanon in 2005. Twitter (using the Internet) helped Iranian protesters.
But the tyrants that are in power today have learned from the past. Sclerotic, clueless tyrannies have been replaced by steely, clued-in regimes. The post-9/11 script was that, as Bush 43 said, "the day of the dictator is over." Especially with an America under a President who eschews democracy promotion, a gives only token comfort to dissenters while preferring negotiations over pressure in dealing with tyrants, the day of the dictator, it seems, is far from over.
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