A New York Times front-pager reports intensifying conflict inside the regime's leadership cadre. Forces pressing for representative government are not the only ones facing down the clerical fascist core:
From the beginning, both have vied for an upper hand, and today both are tarnished. In postelection Iran, there is growing unease among many of the nation’s political and clerical elite that the very system of governance they rely on for power and privilege has been stripped of its religious and electoral legitimacy, creating a virtual dictatorship enforced by an emboldened security apparatus, analysts said.
Among the Iranian president’s allies are those who question whether the nation needs elected institutions at all.
Most telling, and arguably most damning, is that many influential religious leaders have not spoken out in support of the beleaguered president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, or the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Indeed, even among those who traditionally have supported the government, many have remained quiet or even offered faint but unmistakable criticisms.
According to Iranian news reports, only two of the most senior clerics have congratulated Mr. Ahmadinejad on his re-election, which amounts to a public rebuke in a state based on religion. A conservative prayer leader in the holy city of Qum, Ayatollah Ibrahim Amini, referred to demonstrators as “people” instead of rioters, and a hard-line cleric, Grand Ayatollah Nasser Makarem-Shirazi, called for national reconciliation.
Some of Iran’s most influential grand ayatollahs, clerics at the very top of the Shiite faith’s hierarchy who have become identified with the reformists, have condemned the results as a fraud and the government’s handling of the protests as brutal. On Saturday, an influential Qum-based clerical association called the new government illegitimate.
But Ali Khamenei & Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and their few clerical allies still control the security apparatus. The roots of the conflict go back 30 years, and after the Ayatollah Khomeini's death conflict widened, apparently resolved in 2005, but now re-ignited in 2009:
To understand the nature of the conflict, it is essential to look back to the founding of the republic. Ayatollah Khomeini built on two different and often contradictory principles, one of public accountability and one of religious authority. To tie it all together, Ayatollah Khomeini imported a centuries-old religious idea, called velayat-e faqih, or governance of the Islamic jurist. Shiite Muslims believe that they are awaiting the return of the 12th Imam, and under this religious concept the faqih, or supreme leader, serves in his place as a sort of divine deputy.
From the start, there were intense disagreements over how this idea should work. Those conflicts, though, were muted partly by Ayatollah Khomeini’s exalted status, and by a unity forged by an eight-year war with Iraq. When the war ended and Ayatollah Khomeini died, the conflicts erupted. On one side, many clerics once close to Ayatollah Khomeini, including former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, wanted to emphasize the republican aspect of the state without eliminating the special role of the supreme leader. Mohammad Khatami, a midlevel cleric, was elected president on a reform platform.
But Mr. Khatami’s ability to carry out his policies was blocked by hard-liners who saw his vision of Iran as a threat to their interests. Then in 2005, Mr. Ahmadinejad’s election ended the Khatami era. Indeed, in what Iranians saw as a telling gesture, Mr. Ahmadinejad kissed the hand of Ayatollah Khamenei after he was elected. Mr. Ahmadinejad was first elected in a race also shadowed by charges of vote rigging, which were dropped in the name of national unity.
“The events of the June 2009 elections in Iran have largely stripped the Islamic republic of Iran of its republican claim and completed the process that was initiated by the presidential elections of 2005,” said Rasool Nafisi, a professor at Strayer University who follows events in Iran.
Ahmadinejad, for his part, praised Iran's June elections as the "freest" and "healthiest" in the world. Amir Taheri reports that Iran's embattled leaders are blaming an international conspiracy, with (who else?) the Great Satan at its core.
Hudson Institute President Herb London sees appeasement in "engagement" of Iran by Team Obama, and notes its consequences in the real world:
It appears that engagement is talk and more talk. Even the much discussed stringent sanctions on refined petroleum seem like empty palaver, yet another example of wishful thinking without allied support or emotional muscle.
Of course, this raises the awkward question of what talk ultimately means. If all we offer are words that threaten or encourage, words that offend or endear, but are not backed by serious policy options, the verbal exercise is meaningless.
Some have described “soft power,” diplomatic encouragement, as critical to our interests. But this power is beyond soft when the words aren’t supported with action; it is marshmallow power. You can push it, bend it or discard it, for in the end it doesn’t have any bearing on the actions of an opponent.
To engage is to be involved, interlocked. But the Obama administration is participating in a one-way arrangement. It is asking Iran to comply with our desire. Iranian leaders dictate the nature of these so-called exchanges. If the talk is useful as a cover for the further enrichment of uranium, it continues. If the talk is seen as repudiation for violent police tactics on the street, it is rejected. In the face of this direct exchange, the U.S. is actually without real options.
SecState Hillary stated that more sanctions might be in the offing if Iran negotiations fail. Times Online columnist Rosemary Righter calls for tough action now, and open support for Iran's democracy movement; she notes that since 1979 some 5 million Iranians have spent jail time (roughly ten times America's incarceration rate). JCS Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen said time is running out on the Iran nuclear clock; the admiral recently told a Washington think tank that Iran would likely have a nuclear weapon in one to 3 years. Eli Lake reports that Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu has concluded it is futile to seek Team Obama's permission to attack Iran. Ace Bush 43 diplomat John Bolton sees a 2009 Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities as an 80-90% proposition (audio 7:48)--this being the logical consequence of failed negotiations and inadequate sanctions.
Bottom Line. The nuclear clock on Iran is indeed ticking, and there is no reason to think that Israel is counting on either Team Obama success or getting their permission. As negotiations stand zero real-world chance of succeeding, and as super-strong sanctions are highly unlikely to be acceptable to Europeans, the Israeli Air Force needs to refine its plans.
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