Vacation Post: Eve August 11 - August 21, 2009. While I am away on holiday, enjoy daily entries in Discovery Blog, The American Spectator Blog, & The Rosett Report. All are highest quality.
Now, proceed to FIVE special posts: (1) Taliban attacks on Pakistani nuclear sites; (2) investigating the CIA yet again; (3) a startling domestic economic number; (4) the global economic story; (5) a foreign policy triangle. All are well worth pondering for the next 10 days.
Taliban Attacked Pakistani Nuclear Sites. The Times of India reports that there have been several--at least three--Taliban attacks on Pakistani sites where nuclear bombs are stored. Incredibly, even top experts were unaware of these attacks:
The incidents, tracked by Shaun Gregory, a professor at Bradford University in UK, include an attack on the nuclear missile storage facility at Sargodha on November 1, 2007, an attack on Pakistan's nuclear airbase at Kamra by a suicide bomber on December 10, 2007, and perhaps most significantly the August 20, 2008 attack when Pakistani Taliban suicide bombers blew up several entry points to one of the armament complexes at the Wah cantonment, considered one of Pakistan's main nuclear weapons assembly.
These attacks have occurred even as Pakistan has taken several steps to secure and fortify its nuclear weapons against potential attacks, particularly by the United States and India, says Gregory.
In fact, the attacks have received so little attention that Peter Bergen, the eminent terrorism expert who reviewed Gregory's paper first published in West Point's Counter Terrorism Center Sentinel, said "he (Gregory) points out something that was news to me (and shouldn't have been) which is that a series of attacks on Pakistan's nuclear weapons facilities have already happened."
One major problem is physical location of the sites, chosen with keeping them far away from the reach of Indian forces. Thus the northwest corner of Pakistan, close to al-Qaeda & Taliban areas, is where many sites are located. But Pakistan has implemented multi-layer security measures, making diversion probably achievable only with substantial inside help or via a change of regime bringing Islamists to power.
The procedures are described in detail in the article:
Detailing the actions taken by Islamabad to safeguard its nuclear assets from external attacks, Gregory writes that Pakistan has established a "robust set of measures to assure the security of its nuclear weapons." These have been based on copying US practices, procedures and technologies, and comprise: a) physical security; b) personnel reliability programs; c) technical and procedural safeguards; and d) deception and secrecy.
In terms of physical security, Pakistan operates a layered concept of concentric tiers of armed forces personnel to guard nuclear weapons facilities, the use of physical barriers and intrusion detectors to secure nuclear weapons facilities, the physical separation of warhead cores from their detonation components, and the storage of the components in protected underground sites.
With respect to personnel reliability, Gregory says the Pakistan Army conducts a tight selection process drawing almost exclusively on officers from Punjab Province who are considered to have fewer links with religious extremism (now increasingly a questionable premise) or with the Pashtun areas of Pakistan from which groups such as the Pakistani Taliban mainly garner their support.
Pakistan operates an analog to the US Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) that screens individuals for Islamist sympathies, personality problems, drug use, inappropriate external affiliations, and sexual deviancy.
The army uses staff rotation and also operates a "two-person" rule under which no action, decision, or
activity involving a nuclear weapon can be undertaken by fewer than two persons. In total, between 8,000 and 10,000 individuals from the SPD's security division and from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), Military Intelligence and Intelligence Bureau agencies are involved in the security clearance and monitoring of those with nuclear weapons duties.
Gregory says despite formal command authority structures that cede a role to Pakistan’s civilian leadership, in practice the Pakistan Army has complete control over the country's nuclear weapons.
It imposes its executive authority over the weapons through the use of an authenticating code system down through the command chains that is deployment sites, aspects of the nuclear command and control arrangements, and many aspects of the arrangements for nuclear safety and security (such as the numbers of those removed under personnel reliability programs, the reasons for their removal, and how often authenticating and enabling (PAL-type) codes are changed).
In addition, Pakistan uses deception - such as dummy missiles - to complicate the calculus of adversaries and is likely to have extended this practice to its nuclear weapons infrastructure.
Detention for Dummies: Justice Department Investigates CIA Interrogators. Andy McCarthy examines A-G Eric Holder's plan to investigate CIA interrogations of detainees and finds it wanting, to put it mildly. He notes that Holder's exercises of prosecutorial discretion have led him to decline to prosecute Black Panthers who intimidated voters last November, and to free a terrorist detainee rather than risk prosecution and risk the courts publicly examining the government's "rendition" policy (sending detainees to foreign countries where interrogation is conducted using methods we dislike).
McCarthy notes that a number of CIA officers are staying on with the Agency in order to preserve access to classified information they may need for their legal defense. What makes this even worse is that Holder has admitted in Congressional testimony that torture is hard to prove under American law. McCarthy recounts a key exchange with a GOP Congressman:
Rep. Lungren pointed out that if the attorney general truly believes “waterboarding is torture,” he must also think we torture our own Navy SEALs and other special-operations personnel when we waterboard them as part of their training. “No . . . not in the legal sense,” countered Holder. You see, said he, it’s “a fundamentally different thing,” because we’re doing something for training purposes to try to equip them with the tools to, perhaps, resist torture techniques that might be used on them. There is not the intent to do that which is defined as torture — which is to inflict serious bodily or mental harm. It’s for training. It’s different.
"But it’s not different because “it’s for training.” Look at the torture statute (Sections 2340 and 2340A of the federal penal code) and try to find a “training” exception. There isn’t one. What removes an act from the ambit of torture (besides lack of severe pain) is intent. Lungren pressed this point, and Holder admitted that the training was “not torture in the legal sense because we’re not doing it with the intention of harming these people physically or mentally.” Intent, he acknowledged, was the key question.
Then, Lungren pounced. The CIA interrogators who questioned top al-Qaeda captives like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Zubaydah intended no more harm to them than Navy instructors intended to their SEAL trainees. In fact, we know that the CIA went to great lengths, under Justice Department guidance, precisely to avoid severe harm. Their purpose, Rep. Lungren observed, was to “solicit information,” not to inflict torture.
McCarthy noted in another earlier column that the Justice Department--under Holder, no less--took the identical legal position on torture as advocated by Bush administration lawyers, when filing in a case involving extradition of an adjudicated Nazi war criminal (ignore case, statute & regulation legalese citations; CAT refers to the Convention Against Torture):
The case involves John Demjanjuk, a Nazi collaborator who has been fighting his removal from the United States for years. In a last gasp, Demjanjuk now claims, under the CAT, that his extradition would violate U.S. and international torture law. Given his advanced age, failing health, and expectations of abuse, he contends that extradition to Germany for trial and incarceration will cause him severe pain and suffering.
This claim may seem frivolous, but the government nevertheless undertook to respond to it. In so doing, prosecutors argued to the court that even if Demjanjuk were put in severe pain, there could be no torture unless he could establish that government officials had an evil motive to inflict severe pain and suffering on him. As the Holder Justice Department puts it on pp. 20–21 of the elusive DOJ brief:
[T]orture is defined as “an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment and does not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. . . . ” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(2). Moreover, as has been explained by the Third Circuit, CAT requires “a showing of specific intent before the Court can make a finding that a petitioner will be tortured.” Pierre v. Attorney General, 528 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(5) (requiring that the act “be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering”); Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 139 (3d Cir. 2005) (“This is a ‘specific intent’ requirement and not a ‘general intent’ requirement” [citations omitted.] An applicant for CAT protection therefore must establish that “his prospective torturer will have the motive or purpose” to torture him. Pierre, 528 F.3d at 189; Auguste, 395 F.3d at 153-54 (“The mere fact that the Haitian authorities have knowledge that severe pain and suffering may result by placing detainees in these conditions does not support a finding that the Haitian authorities intend to inflict severe pain and suffering. The difference goes to the heart of the distinction between general and specific intent.”) [my bold italics and brackets]. . . .
The Justice Department brief goes on to elaborate that, even accepting for argument’s sake all his claims of anticipated physical abuse, Demjanjuk had failed to state a legal torture claim because he had not shown that German officials had deliberately created and maintained conditions that were specifically intended to cause severe pain and suffering: “To the extent that German authorities may inadvertently cause Petitioner to experience any degree of discomfort during the course of a criminal prosecution or incarceration, this is not cognizable under CAT. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(5) (act causing unintended or unanticipated severity of pain and suffering not torture).”
This is precisely the theory that Bybee and Yoo outlined in the memos that the Justice Department is now citing as a premise for subjecting them to ethical rebuke — and that Obama and Holder have intimated may be grounds for prosecution. Bybee and Yoo reasoned that unless CIA interrogators specifically meant to inflict severe pain and suffering on the high-level al Qaeda detainees they were interrogating, there could be no legally viable claim of torture.
Read McCarthy's three columns in full for great legal analysis and snappy writing accessible to non-lawyers. Put another way, the law distinguishes between general intent & specific intent statutes. Under a general intent law, if you intend the act, you are held to intend its reasonably foreseeable consequences, and can be held liable for same. Under a specific intent statute, you must intend not only the act itself, but intend as well a specific result.
Thus, suppose X flicks a whip at Y, causing Y to feel pain. Under a general intent law X is liable, because the result--pain felt by Y--was an entirely foreseeable result of hitting Y with a whip. A general intent law carries this principle even further. Suppose X aims his whip at Y, but misses Y and strikes his best friend, Z, standing near Y. X still is liable, because one foreseeable outcome of aiming a whip is that one's aim can go awry. (The law calls this "transferred intent"--X aims at Y but misses and strikes Z, it is as if X intended to aim at Z.)
But as McCarthy explains--and Holder, in honest moments, concedes--the Convention Against Torture is a specific intent statute. An interrogator must intend both act and result. His intent must thus be to cause long-term extreme physical or psychological pain. Temporary suffering does not suffice to trigger CAT liability. Merely knowing that long-term suffering will result from one's action--see the Haiti example quoted above--does not suffice for CAT liability, because the specific result, though known to be probable, is not the result intended. Waterboarding as practiced by the CIA is a technique that intends to cause temporary extreme discomfort, for the specific purpose of getting the detainee to yield intelligence that can help hunt down terrorists and/or prevent future attacks. (None of the three al-Qaeda leaders show obvious, visible signs of permanent physical or psychological damage--they have been seen joking in the Gitmo courtroom.)
A Startling Domestic Economic Number. In a Forbes article last February on how government housing policies were a key factor in the ensuing global financial partial meltdown, one finds this number: Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac, the twin monster Government-sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) that carried $1.6 TR in subprime loans to subpar borrowers, were leveraged--meaning the ratio of loans made to assets held to back them--at 75:1. Yes, NOT a misprint: SEVENTY-FIVE TO ONE RATIO OF LIABILITIES TO ASSETS. At such an extreme leverage ratio, a decline of more than 1-1/3 percent makes the leveraged entity insolvent.
Now, compare these numbers to the Wall Street firms like Merrill Lynch, Lehman, etc. They were considered over-leveraged at...30:10 or 40:1. Why then did Fannie & Freddie leverage so highly? MORAL HAZARD: America's Financial Fric & Frac knew the taxpayers--yep, that means You 'n' ME--would pick up the tab if they went financially kaput.
Why Did the Global Financial Model Break and Nearly Melt Down the Entire World Economy? A few weeks ago I posted in the midst of a long article on economic matters an article so important and insightful that I am re-posting it, lest it have been buried too deeply to catch the attention of some LFTC readers. The article, "Now What? How We Got Into Today's Mess and Where We Go From Here", was written by finance super-maven David Smick, author of a brilliant book entitled The World is Curved: Hidden Dangers to the Global Economy (2008). The article runs 10 full pages of printed single-space text, but is well worth an extended, careful read. It explains better than any piece of comparable compactness why the global financial system partially melted down, and identifies many formidable obstacles confronting attempts to restore a long-term path of stable global economic growth.
Iran + Russia + US = Triple Play. Now, in addition, here is an intriguing article from Stratfor chief George Friedman, analyzing permutations--some scary--of the Iran-Russia-US geopolitical triangle. The article is well worth a careful read, and prints at 7 pages.
Hypothesizing on the Iran-Russia-U.S. Triangle
By George Friedman
August 10, 2009
For the past several weeks, STRATFOR has focused on the relationship between Russia and Iran. As our readers will recall, a pro-Rafsanjani demonstration that saw chants of “Death to Russia,”
uncommon in Iran since the 1979 revolution, triggered our discussion.
It caused us to rethink Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit
to Russia just four days after Iran’s disputed June 12 presidential
election, with large-scale demonstrations occurring in Tehran. At the
time, we ascribed Ahmadinejad’s trip as an attempt to signal his lack
of concern at the postelection unrest. But why did a pro-Rafsanjani
crowd chant “Death to Russia?” What had the Russians done to trigger
the bitter reaction from the anti-Ahmadinejad faction? Was the Iranian
president’s trip as innocent as it first looked?
A Net Assessment Re-examined
At STRATFOR, we proceed with what we call a “net assessment,” a
broad model intended to explain the behavior of all players in a game.
Our net assessment of Iran had the following three components:
- Despite the rhetoric, the Iranian nuclear program was far from producing a deliverable weapon, although a test explosion within a few years was a distinct possibility.
- Iran essentially was isolated in the international community, with
major powers’ feelings toward Tehran ranging from hostile to
indifferent. Again, rhetoric aside, this led Iran to a cautious foreign
policy designed to avoid triggering hostility.
- Russia was the most likely supporter of Iran,
but Moscow would avoid becoming overly involved out of fears of the
U.S. reaction, of uniting a fractious Europe with the United States and
of being drawn into a literally explosive situation. The Russians, we
felt, would fish in troubled waters, but would not change the regional
calculus.
This view — in short, that Iran was contained — remained our view
for about three years. It served us well in predicting, for example,
that neither the United States nor Israel would strike Iran, and that
the Russians would not transfer strategically significant weapons to
Iran.
A net assessment is a hypothesis that must be continually tested
against intelligence, however. The “Death to Russia” chant could not be
ignored, nor could Ahmadinejad’s trip to Moscow.
As we probed deeper, we found that Iran was swirling with rumors
concerning Moscow’s relationship with both Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei. Little could be drawn from the rumors. Iran today is a
hothouse for growing rumors, and all our searches ended in dead ends.
But then, if Ahmadinejad and Khamenei were engaging the Russians in
this atmosphere, we would expect rumors and dead ends.
Interestingly, the rumors were consistent that Ahmadinejad and
Khamenei wanted a closer relationship to Russia, but diverged on the
Russian response. Some said the Russians already had assisted the
Iranians by providing intelligence ranging from Israeli networks in
Lebanon to details of U.S. and British plans to destabilize Iran
through a “Green Revolution” like the color revolutions that had ripped
through the former Soviet Union (FSU).
Equally interesting were our Russian sources’ responses. Normally,
they are happy to talk, if only to try to mislead us. (Our Russian
sources are nothing if not voluble.) But when approached about Moscow’s
thinking on Iran, they went silent; this silence stood out. Normally,
our sources would happily speculate — but on this subject, there was no
speculation. And the disciplined silence was universal. This indicated
that those who didn’t know didn’t want to touch the subject, and that
those who did know were keeping secrets. None of this proved anything,
but taken together, it caused us to put our net assessment for Iran on
hold. We could no longer take any theory for granted.
All of the foregoing must be considered in the context of the
current geopolitical system. And that is a matter of understanding what
is in plain sight.
Potential Russian Responses to Washington
The U.S.-Russian summit that took place after the Iranian elections did not go well. U.S. President Barack Obama’s attempt to divide Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Russian Prime Minister Putin
did not bear fruit. The Russians were far more interested in whether
Obama would change the FSU policy of former U.S. President George W.
Bush. At the very least, the Russians wanted the Americans to stop
supporting Ukraine’s and Georgia’s pro-Western tendencies.
But not only did Obama stick with the Bush policy, he dispatched
U.S. Vice President Joe Biden to visit Ukraine and Georgia to drive
home the continuity. This was followed by Biden’s interview with The
Wall Street Journal, in which he essentially said the United States does not have to worry about Russia in the long run because Russia’s economic and demographic problems
will undermine its power. Biden’s statements were completely consistent
with the decision to send him to Georgia and Ukraine, so the Obama
administration’s attempts to back away from the statement were not
convincing. Certainly, the Russians were not convinced. The only
conclusion the Russians could draw was that the United States regards
them as a geopolitical cripple of little consequence.
If the Russians allow the Americans to poach in what Moscow regards
as its sphere of influence without responding, the Russian position
throughout the FSU would begin to unravel — the precise outcome the
Americans hope for. So Moscow took two steps. First, Moscow heated up
the military situation near Georgia on the anniversary of the first war, shifting its posture and rhetoric and causing the Georgians to warn of impending conflict.
Second, Moscow increased its strategic assertiveness, escalating the
tempo of Russian air operations near the United Kingdom and Alaska, and
more important, deploying two Akula-class hunter-killer submarines along the East Coast of the United States. The latter is interesting, but ultimately unimportant. Increased tensions in Georgia
are indeed significant, however, since the Russians have decisive power
in that arena — and can act if they wish against the country, one Biden
just visited to express American support.
But even a Russian move against Georgia would not be decisive. The
Americans have stated that Russia is not a country to be taken
seriously, and that Washington will therefore continue to disregard
Russian interests in the FSU. In other words, the Americans were
threatening fundamental Russian interests.
The Russians must respond, or by default, they would be accepting the
American analysis of the situation — and by extension, so would the
rest of the world. Obama had backed the Russians into a corner.
When we look at the geopolitical chessboard, there are two places where the Russians could really hurt the Americans.
One is Germany. If Moscow could leverage Germany out of the Western
alliance, this would be a geopolitical shift of the first order. Moscow
has leverage with Berlin, as the Germans depend on Russian natural gas,
and the two have recently been working on linking their economies even
further. Moreover, the Germans are as uneasy with Obama as they were
with Bush. German and American interests no longer mesh neatly. The Russians have been courting the Germans, but a strategic shift in Germany’s position
is simply not likely in any time frame that matters to the Russians at
this juncture — though the leaders of the two countries are meeting
once again this week in Sochi, Russia, their second meeting in as many
months.
The second point where the Russians could hurt the Americans is in Iran.
An isolated Iran is not a concern. An Iran with a strong relationship
to Russia is a very different matter. Not only would sanctions be
rendered completely meaningless, but Iran could pose profound strategic
problems for the United States, potentially closing off airstrike
options on Iranian nuclear facilities.
The Strait of Hormuz: Iran’s Real Nuclear Option
The real nuclear option for Iran does not involve nuclear weapons.
It would involve mining the Strait of Hormuz and the narrow
navigational channels that make up the Persian Gulf. During the 1980s,
when Iran and Iraq were at war, both sides attacked oil tankers in the
Persian Gulf. This raised havoc on oil prices and insurance rates.
If the Iranians were to successfully mine these waters, the
disruption to 40 percent of the world’s oil flow would be immediate and
dramatic. The nastiest part of the equation would be that in mine
warfare, it is very hard to know when all the mines have been cleared.
It is the risk, not the explosions, which causes insurance companies to
withdraw insurance on vastly expensive tankers and their loads. It is
insurance that allows the oil to flow.
Just how many mines Iran might lay before being detected and
bringing an American military response could vary by a great deal, but
there is certainly the chance that Iran could lay a significant number
of mines, including more modern influence mines that can take longer to
clear. The estimates and calculations of minesweepers — much less of
the insurers — would depend on a number of factors not available to us
here. But there is the possibility that the strait could be effectively
closed to supertankers for a considerable period. The effect on oil
prices would be severe; it is not difficult to imagine this aborting
the global recovery.
Iran would not want this outcome. Tehran, too, would be greatly
affected by the economic fallout (while Iran is a net exporter of
crude, it is a net importer of gasoline), and the mining would drive
the Europeans and Americans together. The economic and military
consequences of this would be severe. But it is this threat that has
given pause to American and Israeli military planners gaming out
scenarios to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities. There are thousands of
small watercraft along Iran’s coast, and Iran’s response to such raids
might well be to use these vessels to strew mines in the Persian Gulf —
or for swarming and perhaps even suicide attacks.
Notably, any decision to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities would have
to be preceded by (among other things) an attempt to neutralize Iran’s
mine-laying capability — along with its many anti-ship missile
batteries — in the Persian Gulf. The sequence is fixed, since the
moment the nuclear sites are bombed, it would have to be assumed that
the minelayers would go to work, and they would work as quickly as they
could. Were anything else attacked first, taking out the Iranian mine
capability would be difficult, as Iran’s naval assets would scatter and
lay mines wherever and however they could — including by swarms of
speedboats capable of carrying a mine or two apiece and almost
impossible to engage with airpower. This, incidentally, is a leading
reason why Israel cannot unilaterally attack Iran’s nuclear facilities.
They would be held responsible for a potentially disastrous oil
shortage. Only the Americans have the resources to even consider
dealing with the potential Iranian response, because only the Americans
have the possibility of keeping Persian Gulf shipping open once the
shooting starts. It also indicates that an attack on Iran’s nuclear
facilities would be much more complex than a sudden strike completed in
one day.
The United States cannot permit the Iranians to lay the mines. The
Iranians in turn cannot permit the United States to destroy their
mine-laying capability. This is the balance of power that limits both
sides. If Iran were to act, the U.S. response would be severe. If the
United States moves to neutralize Iran, the Iranians would have to push
the mines out fast. For both sides, the risks of threatening the
fundamental interests of the other side are too high. Both Iran and the
United States have worked to avoid this real “nuclear” option.
The Russian Existential Counter
The Russians see themselves facing an existential threat from the
Americans. Whether Washington agrees with Biden or not, this is the
stated American view of Russia, and by itself it poses an existential
threat to Russia. The Russians need an existential counterthreat — and
for the United States, that threat relates to oil. If the Russians
could seriously threaten the supply of oil through the Strait of
Hormuz, the United States would lose its relatively risk-free position
in the FSU.
It follows from this that strengthening Iran’s ability to threaten
the flow of oil, while retaining a degree of Russian control over
Iran’s ability to pull the trigger, would give Russia the counter it
needs to American actions in the FSU. The transfer of more advanced
mines and mining systems to Iran — such as mines that can be planted
now and activated remotely (though most such mines can only lay,
planted and unarmed, for a limited period) to more discriminating and
difficult-to-sweep types of mines — would create a situation the
Americans could neither suppress nor live with. As long as the Russians
could maintain covert control of the trigger, Moscow could place the
United States, and the West’s economies, in check.
Significantly, while this would wreak havoc on Persian Gulf
producers and global oil consumers at a time when they are highly
vulnerable to economic fluctuations, a spike in the price of oil would
not hurt Russia. On the contrary, Russia is an energy exporter, making
it one of the few winners under this scenario. That means the Russians
can afford much greater risks in this game.
We do not know that the Russians have all this in mind. This is
speculation, not a net assessment. We note that if Russo-Iranian
contacts are real, they would have begun well before the Iranian
elections and the summit. But the American view on Russia is not new
and was no secret. Therefore, the Russians could have been preparing
their counter for a while.
We also do not know that the Iranians support this Russian move.
Iranian distrust of Russia runs deep, and so far only the faction
supporting Ahmadinejad appears to be playing this game. But the more
the United States endorses what it calls Iranian reformists,
and supports Rafsanjani’s position, the more Ahmadinejad needs the
Russian counter. And whatever hesitations the Russians might have had
in moving closer to the Iranians, recent events have clearly created a
sense in Moscow of being under attack. The Russians think politically.
The Russians play chess, and the U.S. move to create pressure in the FSU must be countered somewhere.
In intelligence, you must take bits and pieces and analyze them in
the context of the pressures and constraints the various actors face.
You know what you don’t know, but you still must build a picture of the
world based on incomplete data. At a certain point, you become
confident in your intelligence and analysis and you lock it into what
STRATFOR calls its net assessment. We have not arrived at a new net
assessment by any means. Endless facts could overthrow our hypothesis.
But at a certain point, on important matters we feel compelled to
reveal our hypothesis not because we are convinced, but simply because
it is sufficiently plausible to us — and the situation sufficiently
important — that we feel we should share it with the appropriate
caveats. In this case, the stakes are very high, and the hypothesis
sufficiently plausible that it is worth sharing.
The geopolitical chessboard is shifting, though many of the pieces
are invisible. The end may look very different than this, but if it
winds up looking this way, it is certainly worth noting.