Eight years after the atrocities of September 11, 2001 launched militant Islam's third crusade against the West (the second having ended September 11, 1683 at the gates of Vienna), Americans (and their allies) are growing increasingly restive. The combination of the lack of a major terror attack since 9/11 on America's homeland, plus extended multi-tour troop commitments in remote places with uncertain ultimate prospects for victory--and even uncertainty as to what victory means in practical terms--raises again the familiar theme of whether Western publics can sustain a long-term war effort. Partly this is due to news media shortcomings: Robert Kaplan, vastly traveled and a wise voice, writes that al-Jazeera's reporting is not much different than the coverage offered by CNN or the BBC.
Afghanistan is the prime concern today, though Iraq is far from tranquil. Frederick Kagan explains why the status of Pakistan is inseparable from that of the tribal areas in Afghanistan:
Critics of the war have suggested we should draw down our troops and force Pakistan to play a larger role in eliminating radical extremists. American concerns about al Qaeda and Taliban operating from Pakistani bases have led to the conventional wisdom that Pakistan matters to the U.S. because of what it could do to help—or hurt—in Afghanistan. The conventional wisdom is wrong as usual.
Pakistan is important because it is a country of 180 million Muslims with nuclear weapons and multiple terrorist groups engaged in a mini-arms race and periodic military encounters with India—the world's most populous state and one of America's most important economic and strategic partners. Pakistan has made remarkable progress over the last year in its efforts against Islamist insurgent groups that threatened to destroy it. But the fight against those groups takes place on both sides of the border. The debate over whether to commit the resources necessary to succeed in Afghanistan must recognize the extreme danger that a withdrawal or failure in Afghanistan would pose to the stability of Pakistan.
Read his excellent piece in full.
Not all is bleak, thankfully. Ralph Peters, soldier-author extraordinaire and a deep skeptic of our continuing efforts inside Afghanistan (he thinks the tribal and religious atavisms too strong too overcome), reports on what he calls a "wildly successful" new Army training program:
Consider a project that's proven wildly successful: At Ft. Leavenworth's National Simulation Center, a team of soldiers and civilians got a $10 million budget to explore the use of computer-game technology to train soldiers.
Ten million's less than a major contractor would bill the Army for hotel rooms. But our "geeks with muscles" developed sophisticated applications that teach soldiers and officers crucial decision-making, planning and even cultural skills. The interactive training scenarios range from complex ambushes to sitting down with a wary tribal chieftain without triggering a range war.
Under Marco Conners, the deputy dog at the Futures and Integration Directorate, the Army's team not only designed those state-of-the-art training programs, but fielded both the software and supporting hardware to every major military installation -- for half of their budget.
The remaining funds then went for a license that enables our military to use cutting-edge technologies from the civilian gaming world -- potentially saving the taxpayer tens of millions in future rights negotiations and development costs.
Of course, video training isn't going to replace pushups or marksmanship. It's not supposed to. This expands training possibilities -- thrusting soldiers and officers alike into complex situations based on authentic battlefield scenarios.
And the training works. As a dinosaur among dinosaurs, I'm always skeptical around techno-zealots. But the training has been so successful that commanders throughout the Army are begging for more, and the computers in the field are reserved for months in advance. (More are on the way.)
Older commanders seem bemused. One recurring comment is, "I don't know why it works so well, but it just does." Young soldiers love it.
Read the rest of RP's column for more solid, uplifting detail and leadership training.
WSJ pundit Bret Stephens assesses Afghanistan succinctly, and warns of four bad consequences--he calls them "notions" that would take root in the jihadist mind-- if we decamp the country without victory:
Notion One: Attacks on the scale of 9/11 are by no means fatal to the cause of radical Islam. On the contrary, despite the huge losses the movement has suffered over the past eight years, it would emerge from a U.S. defeat in Afghanistan with something it was denied in Iraq: a monumental political and ideological victory from which it could recruit a new field of avid jihadists. Ergo, further attacks on the U.S. homeland could yield similar long-term benefits.
Notion Two: The U.S. has no stomach for long-term counterinsurgency. Ergo, surrender or political accommodation to apparent U.S. military success is pointless; if you hold out long enough, they leave and you win.
Notion Three: The U.S. is not prepared to stand by its clients in the Third World if it believes those clients are morally tainted. That happened to South Vietnam's Nguyen Van Thieu, it happened to the Shah of Iran and, if the U.S. leaves Afghanistan, it will happen to the lamentable Hamid Karzai. Ergo, other shaky or dubious U.S. allies in the Muslim world—Algeria, for instance, or, yes, Saudi Arabia—are prime targets for renewed assault.
Notion Four: A U.S. that doesn't have the stomach for a relatively easy fight like Afghanistan, where even now casualties are a fraction of what they were in Iraq during the worst of the fighting, will have even less stomach for much tougher fights. Ergo, maximum efforts should go into destabilizing and, not implausibly, taking over Pakistan, a country that, as Mr. Will says, "actually matters."
Iran. A New York Times front=pager today reports that US intelligence has concluded Iran now can quickly make an atomic bomb:
American intelligence agencies have concluded in recent months that Iran has created enough nuclear fuel to make a rapid, if risky, sprint for a nuclear weapon. But new intelligence reports delivered to the White House say that the country has deliberately stopped short of the critical last steps to make a bomb.
In the first public acknowledgment of the intelligence findings, the American ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency declared on Wednesday that Iran now had what he called a “possible breakout capacity” if it decided to enrich its stockpile of uranium, converting it to bomb-grade material.
The New York Times reported earlier this week that Muhammad el-Baradei, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspector told his UN superiors that a "stalemate" exists with Iran: the regime will neither stop its uranium enrichment program nor negotiate about doing so. New York City DA Robert Morgenthau, a paragon of the old school, reveals the emerging Iran-Venezuelan axis:Iranian military technology for Venezuelan refined oil. Here is his Sept. 8 Brookings Address text. UN maven Claudia Rosett adds perspective on Chavez's UN visit & implications of the Iran-Venezuelan relationship for US diplomacy (ominous).
North Korea. The WSJ editors discuss Kim's uranium enrichment move. The hawks were right.
Air Power. If all the above is not enough, AEI scholar Tom Donnelly argues (rightly) that we are giving away our unchallenged aerial pre-eminence, which augurs ill for our future national security position.
Bottom Line. The West must resolve morally ambiguous issues with sufficient clarity to enable pursuit of its war aims. Given the difficulty of promoting liberal democracy in remote areas culturally inhospitable to the liberal variety, we may have to settle for pacification that curtails use of remote areas as command bases from which terrorists can launch global operations.
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