Stratfor's George Friedman offers his strategist's view of US - Israel relations, reprinted with permission from Stratfor:
An Israeli Prime Minster Comes to Washington Again
May 18, 209
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is visiting Washington for
his first official visit with U.S. President Barack Obama. A range of
issues — including the future of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, Israeli-Syrian talks
and Iran policy — are on the table. This is one of an endless series of
meetings between U.S. presidents and Israeli prime ministers over the
years, many of which concerned these same issues. Yet little has
changed.
That Israel has a new prime minister and the United States a new
president might appear to make this meeting significant. But this is
Netanyahu’s second time as prime minister, and his government is as
diverse and fractious as most recent Israeli governments. Israeli
politics are in gridlock, with deep divisions along multiple fault
lines and an electoral system designed to magnify disagreements.
Obama is much stronger politically, but he has consistently acted
with caution, particularly in the foreign policy arena. Much of his
foreign policy follows from the Bush administration. He has made no
major breaks in foreign policy beyond rhetoric; his policies on Iraq,
Afghanistan, Iran, Russia and Europe are essentially extensions of
pre-existing policy. Obama faces major economic problems in the United
States and clearly is not looking for major changes in foreign policy.
He understands how quickly public sentiment can change, and he does not
plan to take risks he does not have to take right now.
This, then, is the problem: Netanyahu is coming to Washington hoping
to get Obama to agree to fundamental redefinitions of the regional
dynamic. For example, he wants Obama to re-examine the commitment to a
two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. (Netanyahu’s
foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, has said Israel is no longer bound
by prior commitments to that concept.) Netanyahu also wants the United
States to commit itself to a finite time frame for talks with Iran,
after which unspecified but ominous-sounding actions are to be taken.
Facing a major test in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Obama has more than enough to deal with at the moment. Moreover, U.S. presidents who get involved in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations
frequently get sucked into a morass from which they do not return. For
Netanyahu to even request that the White House devote attention to the
Israeli-Palestinian problem at present is asking a lot. Asking for a
complete review of the peace process is even less realistic.
Obstacles to the Two-State Solution
The foundation of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process for years has been the assumption that there would be a two-state solution.
Such a solution has not materialized for a host of reasons. First, at
present there are two Palestinian entities, Gaza and the West Bank,
which are hostile to each other. Second, the geography and economy of
any Palestinian state would be so reliant on Israel
that independence would be meaningless; geography simply makes the
two-state proposal almost impossible to implement. Third, no
Palestinian government would have the power to guarantee that rogue
elements would not launch rockets at Israel, potentially striking at
the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem corridor, Israel’s heartland. And fourth,
neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis have the domestic political
coherence to allow any negotiator to operate from a position of
confidence. Whatever the two sides negotiated would be revised and
destroyed by their political opponents, and even their friends.
For this reason, the entire peace process — including the two-state
solution — is a chimera. Neither side can live with what the other can
offer. But if it is a fiction, it is a fiction that serves U.S.
purposes. The United States has interests that go well beyond Israeli
interests and sometimes go in a different direction altogether. Like
Israel, the United States understands that one of the major obstacles
to any serious evolution toward a two-state solution is Arab hostility
to such an outcome.
The Jordanians have feared and loathed Fatah in the West Bank ever
since the Black September uprisings of 1970. The ruling Hashemites are
ethnically different from the Palestinians (who constitute an
overwhelming majority of the Jordanian population), and they fear that
a Palestinian state under Fatah would threaten the Jordanian monarchy.
For their part, the Egyptians see Hamas as a descendent of the Muslim Brotherhood,
which seeks the Mubarak government’s ouster — meaning Cairo would hate
to see a Hamas-led state. Meanwhile, the Saudis and the other Arab
states do not wish to see a radical altering of the status quo, which
would likely come about with the rise of a Palestinian polity.
At the same time, whatever the basic strategic interests of the Arab
regimes, all pay lip service to the principle of Palestinian statehood.
This is hardly a unique situation. States frequently claim to favor
various things they actually are either indifferent to or have no
intention of doing anything about. Complicating matters for the Arab
states is the fact that they have substantial populations that do care
about the fate of the Palestinians. These states thus are caught
between public passion on behalf of Palestinians and the regimes’
interests that are threatened by the Palestinian cause. The states’
challenge, accordingly, is to appear to be doing something on behalf of
the Palestinians while in fact doing nothing.
The United States has a vested interest in the preservation of these
states. The futures of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are of
vital importance to Washington. The United States must therefore
simultaneously publicly demonstrate its sensitivity to pressures from
these nations over the Palestinian question while being careful to
achieve nothing — an easy enough goal to achieve.
The various Israeli-Palestinian peace processes have thus served U.S. and Arab interests
quite well. They provide the illusion of activity, with high-level
visits breathlessly reported in the media, succeeded by talks and
concessions — all followed by stalemate and new rounds of violence,
thus beginning the cycle all over again.
The Palestinian Peace Process as Political Theater
One of the most important proposals Netanyahu is bringing to Obama
calls for reshaping the peace process. If Israeli President Shimon
Peres is to be believed, Netanyahu will not back away from the
two-state formula. Instead, the Israeli prime minister is asking that
the various Arab state stakeholders become directly involved in the
negotiations. In other words, Netanyahu is proposing that Arab states
with very different public and private positions on Palestinian
statehood be asked to participate — thereby forcing them to reveal
publicly their true positions, ultimately creating internal political
crises in the Arab states.
The clever thing about this position is that Netanyahu not only
knows his request will not become a reality, but he also does not want
it to become a reality. The political stability of Jordan, Saudi Arabia
and Egypt is as much an Israeli interest as an American one. Indeed,
Israel even wants a stable Syria, since whatever would come after the
Alawite regime in Damascus would be much more dangerous to Israeli
security than the current Syrian regime.
Overall, Israel is a conservative power. In terms of nation-states,
it does not want upheaval; it is quite content with the current regimes
in the Arab world. But Netanyahu would love to see an international
conference with the Arab states roundly condemning Israel publicly.
This would shore up the justification for Netanyahu’s policies
domestically while simultaneously creating a framework for reshaping
world opinion by showing an Israel isolated among hostile states.
Obama is likely hearing through diplomatic channels from the Arab
countries that they do not want to participate directly in the
Palestinian peace process. And the United States really does not want
them there, either. The peace process normally ends in a train wreck
anyway, and Obama is in no hurry to see the wreckage. He will want to
insulate other allies from the fallout, putting off the denouement of
the peace process as long as possible. Obama has sent George Mitchell
as his Middle East special envoy to deal with the issue, and from the
U.S. president’s point of view, that is quite enough attention to the
problem.
Netanyahu, of course, knows all this. Part of his mission is simply
convincing his ruling coalition — and particularly Lieberman, whom
Netanyahu needs to survive, and who is by far Israel’s most aggressive
foreign minister ever — that he is committed to redefining the entire
Israeli-Palestinian relationship. But in a broader context, Netanyahu
is looking for greater freedom of action. By posing a demand the United
States will not grant, Israel is positioning itself to ask for
something that appears smaller.
Israel and the Appearance of Freedom of Action
What Israel actually would do with greater freedom of action is far
less important than simply creating the appearance that the United
States has endorsed Israel’s ability to act in a new and unpredictable
manner. From Israel’s point of view, the problem with
Israeli-Palestinian relations is that Israel is under severe
constraints from the United States, and the Palestinians know it. This
means that the Palestinians can even anticipate the application of
force by Israel, meaning they can prepare for it and endure it. From
Netanyahu’s point of view, Israel’s primary problem is that the
Palestinians are confident they know what the Israelis will do. If
Netanyahu can get Obama to introduce a degree of ambiguity into the
situation, Israel could regain the advantage of uncertainty.
The problem for Netanyahu is that Washington is not interested in
having anything unpredictable happen in Israeli-Palestinian relations.
The United States is quite content with the current situation,
particularly while Iraq becomes more stable and the Afghan situation
remains unstable. Obama does not want a crisis from the Mediterranean
to the Hindu Kush. The fact that Netanyahu has a political coalition to
satisfy will not interest the United States, and while Washington at
some unspecified point might endorse a peace conference, it will not be
until Israel and its foreign minister endorse the two-state formula.
Netanyahu will then shift to another area where freedom of action is
relevant — namely, Iran. The Israelis have leaked to the Israeli media
that the Obama administration has told them that Israel may not attack
Iran without U.S. permission, and that Israel agreed to this
requirement. (U.S. President George W. Bush and Israeli Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert went through the same routine not too long ago, using a
good cop/bad cop act in a bid to kick-start negotiations with Iran.)
In reality, Israel would have a great deal of difficulty attacking
Iranian facilities with non-nuclear forces. A multitarget campaign
1,000 miles away against an enemy with some air defenses could be a
long and complex operation. Such a raid would require a long trip
through U.S.-controlled airspace for the fairly small Israeli air
force. Israel could use cruise missiles, but the tonnage of high
explosive delivered by a cruise missile cannot penetrate even
moderately hardened structures; the same is true for ICBMs carrying
conventional warheads. Israel would have to notify the United States of
its intentions because it would be passing through Iraqi airspace — and
because U.S. technical intelligence would know what it was up to before
Israeli aircraft even took off. The idea that Israel might consider
attacking Iran without informing Washington is therefore absurd on the
surface. Even so, the story has surfaced yet again in an Israeli
newspaper in a virtual carbon copy of stories published more than a
year ago.
Netanyahu has promised that the endless stalemate with the
Palestinians will not be allowed to continue. He also knows that
whatever happens, Israel cannot threaten the stability of Arab states
that are by and large uninterested in the Palestinians. He also
understands that in the long run, Israel’s freedom of action is defined
by the United States, not by Israel. His electoral platform and his
strategic realities have never aligned. Arguably, it might be in the
Israeli interest that the status quo be disrupted, but it is not in the
American interest. Netanyahu therefore will get to redefine neither the
Palestinian situation nor the Iranian situation. Israel simply lacks
the power to impose the reality it wants, the current constellation of
Arab regimes it needs, and the strategic relationship with the United
States on which Israeli national security rests.
In the end, this is a classic study in the limits of power. Israel
can have its freedom of action anytime it is willing to pay the price
for it. But Israel can’t pay the price. Netanyahu is coming to
Washington to see if he can get what he wants without paying the price,
and we suspect strongly he knows he won’t get it. His problem is the
same as that of the Arab states. There are many in Israel, particularly
among Netanyahu’s supporters, who believe Israel is a great power.
It isn’t. It is a nation that is strong partly because it lives in a
pretty weak neighborhood, and partly because it has very strong
friends. Many Israelis don’t want to be told that, and Netanyahu came
to office playing on the sense of Israeli national power.
So the peace process will continue, no one will expect anything from
it, the Palestinians will remain isolated and wars regularly will break
out. The only advantage of this situation from the U.S. point of view
it is that it is preferable to all other available realities.