Instead, Mr. Blair offered a ringing defense of the decision to invade Iraq, and a very different set of lessons for the present. "This isn't about a lie, or a conspiracy, or a deceit, or a deception. It is a decision," Mr. Blair told a packed room that included relatives of soldiers killed in Iraq. "And the decision I had to take was, given [Saddam's] history, given his use of chemical weapons, given the over one million people whose deaths he had caused, given 10 years of breaking U.N. resolutions, could we take the risk of this man reconstituting his weapons program?"
That's a point worth remembering over all the Monday-morning recriminations about "dodgy dossiers" and missing WMD. We have never for a moment believed that the British or U.S. governments deliberately misled their publics over what they thought they knew about Saddam's weapons. Every Western country, including those opposed to the war, believed Saddam had WMD.
But the important point was never so much about what Saddam did or did not possess so much as it was about what he intended. And as Mr. Blair pointed out Friday, "What we now know is that he [Saddam] retained the intent and the intellectual know-how to restart a nuclear and a chemical weapons program when the inspectors were out and the sanctions changed, which they were going to do. . . .
"Today we would be facing a situation where Iraq was competing with Iran, competing both on nuclear weapons capability and competing more importantly perhaps than anything else . . . in respect of support of terrorist groups. . . . If I am asked whether I believe we are safer, more secure, that Iraq is better, that our own security is better, with Saddam and his two sons out of office and out of power, I believe indeed we are."
Bottom Line. Preventive war premised upon prewar intelligence carries with it the elevated risk of perceived failure, should the intel prove mistaken. Future preventive wars must be premised instead upon publicly established, incontrovertible facts, and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Thus with Iran there is no reasonable alternate inference to their nuclear program being intended ultimately for military purposes, as: (a) they have no commercial need for nuclear power; and (b) they are running a clandestine program, which would be unnecessary were their program solely legitimate civilian nuclear power.
Letter from the Capitol, LFTC, 9/11, National Security, Nuclear Proliferation, Arms Control, WMD, Foreign Policy
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