Rowan Scarborough reports in Human Events how years of courting Pakistani officials is now paying off in precise intelligence enabling targeting of senior Taliban leaders. The WSJ reports in a similar vein, but its article expresses less confidence that the game has changed....
The WSJ reviews that past five years of US-Pakistani intel relations:
The turnabout is one of the most dramatic offshoots of the military surge in neighboring Afghanistan.
It follows mounting distrust between the U.S. and Pakistani intelligence services, which began about five years ago, in which the Americans believed the Pakistanis weren't sharing all their intelligence on Taliban in the country, and Pakistanis were suspicious of U.S. motives.
A more recent push from both sides to bridge the gap—including pressure from U.S. officials who provided evidence that elements of Pakistan's spy services were offering funding and intelligence to the Taliban—is yielding closer intelligence cooperation, officials said.
"America has an advantage in technical intelligence: eyes in the sky," one Pakistani official said. "We have people on ground. If you can match those in a timely manner, you get better results."
American officials say the Pakistanis have come to believe that the Afghan Taliban poses a threat to domestic stability. Pakistani cooperation has "picked up as the Pakistanis have come to understand even more clearly the serious threat they themselves face from terrorists," a U.S. official said. "With the American commitment in Afghanistan growing, with American and Coalition soldiers dying in battle, the Pakistanis know they must also take action against the Afghan Taliban."
A New York Times front-pager today adds detail on the complex relationship between American & Pakistani services.
And yet for two spy agencies with a long history of mistrust, the accommodation extends only so far. For instance, when it comes to the endgame in Afghanistan, where Pakistan hopes to play a significant role as a power broker, interviews with Pakistani and American intelligence officials in Islamabad and Washington reveal that the interests of the two sides remain far apart.
Even as the ISI breaks up a number of Taliban cells, officials in Islamabad, Washington and Kabul hint that the ISI’s goal seems to be to weaken the Taliban just enough to bring them to the negotiating table, but leaving them strong enough to represent Pakistani interests in a future Afghan government.
This contrasts sharply with the American goal of battering the Taliban and strengthening Kabul’s central government and security forces, even if American officials also recognize that political reconciliation with elements of the Taliban is likely to be part of any ultimate settlement.
Tensions in the relationship surfaced in the days immediately after Mullah Baradar’s arrest, when the ISI refused to allow C.I.A. officers to interrogate the Taliban leader. Americans have since been given access to the detention center. On Wednesday, Pakistani and Afghan officials meeting in Islamabad said that a deal was being worked out to transfer Mullah Baradar to Afghan custody, which could allow the Americans unrestrained access to him.
The endgame is very much up in the air:
As a result there remains a belief among American intelligence officials that Pakistan will never completely abandon the Taliban, and officials both in Washington and Kabul admit that they are almost completely in the dark about Pakistan’s long-term strategy regarding the Taliban.
“We have a better level of cooperation,” said one top American official who met recently in Islamabad with General Kayani. “How far that goes, I can’t tell yet. We’ll know soon whether this is cooperation, or a stonewall and kind of rope a dope.”
So, consider the matter an ongoing issue.
Bottom Line. In the meantime: Praise to Bush 43 and Obama 44 for years of hard, unglamorous work behind closed doors.
Letter from the Capitol, LFTC, 9/11, National Security, Foreign Policy
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